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MEDELLÍN AND ORIGINALISM
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court permitted Texas to proceed
with the execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely
notice of his right of consular notification and consultation in violation
of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. It did so despite its finding that the United States
had an obligation under treaty law to comply with an order of the
International Court of Justice that Medellín’s case be granted review
and reconsideration. The international obligation, the Court found, was
not domestically enforceable because the treaties at issue were not selfexecuting. The five Justices who signed the Chief Justice’s Majority
opinion, including the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists, thus joined
an opinion that construed the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause without
any serious consideration of its language or the history of its drafting,
ignoring evidence of the Supremacy Clause’s original meaning cited by
the dissenting Justices.
This Article explores the meaning of originalism in the context of the
Court’s Medellín decision and contends that the Majority’s opinion,
while perhaps defensible on other grounds, cannot be reconciled with
any identifiable version of originalism. Rather it is best understood as a
decision reflecting the conservative Majority’s political commitment to
favor principles of U.S. sovereignty and federalism over compliance with
international obligations, even when the consequences of such a
commitment is to enable state governments to undermine the foreign
policy decisions of the political branches of the federal government.
Ultimately, however, the Article concludes that Medellín’s case
never should have come before the Court. The President has a duty to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The Court determined
that the Bush administration did not satisfy this duty by issuing an
Executive Memorandum directing states to comply with the judgment of
the International Court of Justice. That being the case, the President
now must comply with his Take Care Clause duties by working with
Congress to make certain that federal law compels compliance with the
International Court of Justice’s judgment. Indeed, this Article contends
that the Medellín case is emblematic of the U.S. executive branch’s
broader failure to ensure that all treaties requiring domestic
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implementation are in fact implemented so as to avoid placing the United
States in violation of its international obligations.
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[O]riginalism is not, and ha[s] perhaps never been, the
sole method of constitutional exegesis. It would be hard to
count on the fingers of both hands and the toes of both feet,
yea even on the hairs of one’s youthful head, the opinions
that have in fact been rendered not on the basis of what the
Constitution originally meant, but on the basis of what the
judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean. . . . But
in the past, nonoriginalist opinions have almost always had
the decency to lie, or at least to dissemble about what they
were doing – either ignoring strong evidence of an original
intent that contradicted the minimal recited evidence of an
original intent congenial to the court’s desires, or else not
discussing original intent at all, speaking in terms of broad
constitutional generalities with no pretense of historical
support.1

1

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852
(1989).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia knows whereof he speaks. In Medellín v. Texas,2
the U.S. Supreme Court found that Texas was entitled to ignore the
ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Avena case3
as well as a Presidential memorandum directing states to comply
with that ruling [hereinafter President’s Memorandum].4 The
Court thus permitted Texas to proceed with the execution of a
Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of his right
of consular notification and consultation in violation of the United
States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR).5
2
3

Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.

31).
4

Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S.
Att’y
Gen.
(Feb.
28,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ 20050228-18.html (last
visited June 12, 2008). The entire text of the memorandum is as follows:
SUBJECT: Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of
Justice in Avena
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (the "Convention") and the Convention's Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional
Protocol), which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the "interpretation and
application" of the Convention.

I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that
the United States will discharge its inter-national obligations under the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of
America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give
effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
GEORGE W. BUSH
5
Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no. 6820. See id., Art.
36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal defendant,
“the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the
consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of

4
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It did so without serious consideration of the Supremacy
Clause, which reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof: and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the Untied
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.6
One would think that the Court would put some energy into
explaining why, in this case, a state court must be permitted to
allow state procedural laws prohibiting successive habeas
petitions7 to trump a treaty, in this case the U.N. Charter,8 Article
94 of which requires member states to comply with decisions of
the ICJ. 9 Its holding, in the end, turns on the extra-constitutional
doctrine that some treaties are non-self-executing and therefore are
not supreme law in the United States unless implemented through
congressional legislation.10 But the opinion makes no effort to
square the doctrine of self-execution with the original meaning of
that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner”). The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its
Article 36 obligations with respect to Avena and other Mexican nationals,
including Medellín. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71-72, ¶ 153 (finding, by a vote
of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations under
Article 36(1) of the VCCR).
6
U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).
7
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (reviewing the procedural history of Medellín’s
case and noting that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had found that
“neither the Avena decision nor the President’s Memorandum was ‘binding
federal law’ that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of successive
habeas applications”).
8
59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
9
Id. at Art. 94(1) (requiring member states to “undertake to comply” with
decisions of the ICJ).
10
See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (noting that “[t]his Court has long
recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as
domestic law and those that . . . do not” and citing to Justice Marshall’s 1828
opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 22 Pet. 253, 315 (1829), as explaining the
doctrine).
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the Supremacy Clause,11 and it ignores historical legal scholarship
cited by the dissent that suggests that the purpose of that clause
was to guarantee that most treaties would be self-executing.12
By joining the opinion in Medellín, the Supreme Court’s two
self-proclaimed originalists, Justices Scalia13 and Thomas,14 as
11

See infra Part IV.
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting), citing Carlos Vázquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995);
Martin Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2095 (1999). Justice Breyer also includes a “but see” citation to John Yoo,
Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original
Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999). Yoo’s article, along with John
Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of NonSelf-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) and JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 215-49
(2005), could have provided an originalist argument in support of the Majority’s
opinion, were the Majority interested in making such arguments. In any case,
scholars have rejected Yoo’s arguments. See, e.g., D.A. Jeremy Telman, The
Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter? 80 TEMP. L. REV. 245,
283 (2007) (noting that Yoo’s views on self-execution are without support in the
historical record); Michael D. Ramsey, Toward a Rule of Law in Foreign
Affairs, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1450, 1451 (2006) (concluding that Yoo “drifts too
far from the Framers’ expressed understandings of their own text, and from the
historical meanings of the words they used”); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing
Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. 1213, 1232, n. 75 (2005) (characterizing Yoo’s
position as “in tension with the plain language” of the Supremacy Clause, “not
widely endorsed” and having “little judicial support”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2161 (1999) (finding not a
shred of evidence to support the view that the Framer’s intended for the House
of Representatives to have the power to block treaties in force); Flaherty,
History Right, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 2120-21 (reviewing records of the
Constitutional Convention and finding them to support the notion that treaties
were to be presumptively self-executing).
13
Justices Scalia and Thomas are routinely identified as originalists. See, e.g.,
Stephen Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, unpublished
manuscript,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1009393 (last visited Apr.
11, 2008), at 10 (describing Justices Scalia and Thomas as “conservative
originalists) (cited with permission of the author); Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism
is
Bunk,
unpublished
manuscript,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078933 (last visited Apr.
11, 2008), at 1 (identifying Justices Scalia and Thomas as originalists). Justice
Scalia has proclaimed himself an originalist in innumerable contexts. See e.g.,

12
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well as Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts who, in their Senate
confirmation hearings “evinced sympathy for the originalist
position,”15 are complicit in a return to what Justice Scalia
ironically dubbed the “decent” judicial opinions of the past, in
which judges dissemble about what they are doing, not discussing
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2303 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
proper course of constitutional interpretation is to give the text the meaning it
was understood to have at the time of its adoption by the people.”); Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2139 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I take it to be a
fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that the terms of in the
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the time of their
ratification.”).
14
Justice Thomas has expressly embraced originalism in Clarence Thomas,
Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (reiterating a position expressed in his
written opinions that “judges should seek the original understanding of the
[constitutional] provision’s text, if that text’s meaning is not readily apparent”).
Indeed, Thomas has repeatedly invoked originalism as his preferred method of
interpretation in his legal opinions. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct.
2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that
public schools may prohibit speech advocating illegal drug use but writing
separately to stress that the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not
protect student speech in public schools); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
115 S.Ct. 1511, 1525 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (concurring in the result
but reaching it by means of an inquiry into whether “the phrase ‘freedom of
speech, or of the press,’ as originally understood, protected anonymous political
leafletting”); Helling v. McKinney,113 S.Ct. 2475, 2484 (1993) (Thomas, Scalia
JJ., dissenting) (finding, based on the original meaning of “punishment,” that the
petitioners cannot not rely on the Eighth Amendment to protest prison
conditions).
Scholars have noted the originalist cast of Justice Thomas’s
jurisprudence. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN CONSERVATISM 260 (2004) (characterizing
Justice Thomas as making the most extensive originalist case for expanding
judicially enforceable limits on congressional power).
15
Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? Due
Process Procedural Innovation and . . . Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3
(2007), citing Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 357 (2006) (statement of
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and
Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination
of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159, 570 (2005) (statement and
written response of John G. Roberts, Jr., J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, and Nominee to the U.S. Supreme Court).
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original intent or original meaning at all, and decide cases in
accordance with their own views, with nary a pretense of historical
support.16 In Medellín, it was the “living constitutionalists”17 who
with one exception18 joined in Justice Breyer’s dissent.19 That
dissent relied heavily on historical scholarship into the original
meaning of the Supremacy Clause,20 and informed by that
historical evidence and by case law largely ignored by the
Majority, concluded that the Texas courts are bound, pursuant to
the VCCR, the Optional Protocol to that Convention,21 and Article
94 of the U.N. Charter, to implement the ICJ’s Avena decision.22
16

Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 852.
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer are often characterized as
being in the living constitutionalist camp. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Politics
and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of
Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore? 94 GEO. L. J. 1475, 1481 (2006) (naming
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer as the court’s “living
constitutionalists”); Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science
and the Possibility of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the
Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 737, 749 (2003) (stating that Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer subscribe to an agenda of living
constitutionalism essentially consistent with that of the Warren Court). Justice
Breyer has made his commitment to living constitutionalism more or less
express in a recent publication, STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006). In that book, Justice
Breyer describes his own approach as seeking to avoid constitutional
interpretations that are either “willful, in the sense of enforcing individual
views,” that is simply enforcing “whatever [the judge] thinks best” or “wooden,
in uncritically resting on formulas, in assuming the familiar to be the necessary,
in not realizing that any problem can be solved if only one principle is involved
but that unfortunately all controversies of importance involve if not a conflict at
least an interplay of principles.” Id. at 18, 19 (quoting Justice Frankfurter,
Learned Hand and Justice Brandeis).
18
Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in Medellín, in which he relies
only on the language of the relevant treaties in finding them to be non-selfexecuting, without any reference to the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1372-73 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19
Id. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
20
See discussion infa Part IV.B.
21
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on consular Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, done on Apr. 24, 1963
[1970], 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. T.I.A.S. no. 6820.
22
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1375 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17
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Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the , did not engage this
historical evidence in earnest, instead relying on his own
idiosyncratic and poorly documented version of our constitutional
history and judicial precedent23 in finding that the relevant treaties
are all non-self-executing and therefore not enforceable as U.S.
law absent congressional implementing legislation.24
This Article explores the paradoxical refusal of the originalist
Justices to even acknowledge the strong originalist arguments of
the dissenting Justices in Medellín. It thus contributes to the
growing literature that exposes the inconsistency of the Court’s
self-proclaimed originalists.25 It would be churlish to point out
23

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356 (finding that because none of the treaties at
issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation and that no such legislation exists, the Avena judgment is not binding
domestic law).
25
See, e.g., KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 258 (arguing that the Rehnquist
Court’s conservative majority relies only sporadically on originalist arguments
in “activist” decisions); Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
Establishment Clause (forthcoming NORTHWEST. L. REV. (2008), draft posted at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=112482 (last visited June 12, 2008), manuscript at 2
(arguing that Justices Rehnquist’s, Scalia’s and Thomas’s interpretations of the
establishment clause “are remarkably indifferent to the original purposes of that
clause”); Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning, 60 OKLA L.
REV. at 25-26 (contending that Scalia’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause
is not originalist); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of ‘FaintHearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006) (contending that Scalia
simply discards constitutional provisions that do not meet with his approval).
Indeed, there are scholarly attacks on Scalia’s consistency in interpretive
strategies that go beyond constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige
McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, University of
San Diego School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper
No. 08-15, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113541 (last visited June 15, 2008)
(arguing that Scalia often departs from textualism in statutory interpretation and
that in cases when he follows his purported methodology, he often finds, based
on resort to an eclectic variety of extrinsic materials that the assumption in favor
or the ordinary meaning of the statutory language is overcome); George H.
Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995) (developing a
positive account of the methodology of textualism – as opposed to viewing
textualism simply as a critique of intentionalism – but concluding that
textualism does not succeed in limiting or eliminating judicial discretion in
24
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such inconsistency but for the fact that the originalist Justices have
been outspoken in defending a version of originalism that they do
not practice, and in his public statements on the subject Justice
Scalia has posited a dichotomy between originalism and nonoriginalism in which he himself does not believe.26 Such
hypocrisy ought not to pass without scholarly comment.27 As
statutory or constitutional interpretation); William D. Popkin, An “Internal”
Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1133, 1173-86 (1992) (rejecting Scalia’s argument that public respect for the
courts is eroded when courts depart from the textualist approach and inquire into
legislative intent); William Eskridge, The New Textualism 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 671 (1990) (“It does not readily appear that the structure and background of
the Constitution support the new textualism over other theories of statutory
interpretation.”).
26
See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 862 (acknowledging that
“there is really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the
moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most originalists are faint-hearted and most
nonoriginalists are moderate.”). Scalia often claims that being an originalist is
tough. He does not just get to vote however he likes in every case. Scalia
illustrates this point with a story about his wife mockingly humming “It’s a
Grand Old Flag” or “Stars and Stripes Forever” (the song changes; the story
does not) for him when he comes down for breakfast the morning after joining
in an opinion that permitted flag burning. See, e.g., Transcipt: NPR News
Morning Edition, April 28, 2008, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
Discusses His New Book, Being a Part of the McCain Dream Ticket and His
Eternal
Gratitude
Towards
President
George
H.W.
Bush,
http://www.npr.org/about/press/2008/042808.AntoninScalia.html (last visited
June 11, 2008) (telling the “It’s a Grand Old Flag” story and noting, that “the
living constitution jurist is always a happy fella because the case always comes
out the way he thinks it ought to”); University Record Online, Scalia says to
focus on original meaning of Constitution, Nov. 24, 2004,
http://www.ur.umich.edu/0405/Nov22_04/13.shtml (last visited June 11, 2008)
(reporting on the “Grand Old Flag” story and noting that being an originalist
does not always make Scalia popular with conservatives); W&M News, Justice
Antonin Scalia: The case for “dead Constitution”, Mar. 21, 2004,
http://www.wm.edu/news/?id=3486 (last visited June 11, 2008) (quoting Scalia
as contrasting his experience with that of the “living constitutionalist” and
characterizing the latter’s position as “Whatever he thinks is good, is in the
Constitution”). It is a nice story, but Scalia’s faint-hearted originalism permits
him to vote as he likes with great regularity.
27
Another theme invoked by Justice Scalia and other originalists is that
originalism is the only coherent approach to constitutional interpretation, unless
one’s approach is nihilism. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith,

10
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Mitchell Berman has recently argued, in at least some of its forms,
originalism is, or can be, pernicious.28
It is pernicious because of its tendency to be
deployed in the public square – on the campaign
trail, on talk radio, in Senate confirmation hearings,
even in Supreme Court opinions – to bolster the
popular fable that constitutional adjudication can be
practiced in something close to an objective and
mechanical fashion…. [T]here is little doubt that
originalism is often used . . . to pander to that
American populist taste for simple answers to
complex questions. By thus nourishing skepticism,
even demonization, of judicial reasoning that cannot
be reduced to sound bite, originalism threatens to
undermine the judiciary’s unique and essential role
in our system of government.29
It is not the position of the Article that the proper result in
Medellín should have been determined solely by giving effect to
the Court’s understanding of the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause, although one certainly expects a constitutional
case to be decided with some attention given to the constitutional
text at issue and, if the text is unclear, to its ratification history.

Originalism’s
Living
Constitutionalism,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090282 (last visited April
12, 2008), manuscript at 1-2 (summarizing the views of originalists, including
Justice Scalia, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Randy Barnett, Robert Bork, Edwin
Meese III and Raoul Berger, all of whom content that originalism is the only
consistent theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation). Colby and
Smith argue that originalism is, in fact, self-contradictory and incoherent and
thus is no different from the living constitutionalism that originalists so abhor.
See id. at 42-43 (characterizing originalism as “staggering array of sometimes
inconsistent approaches which go a long way towards creating a living
constitutionalism”). See also Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 11 (contending
that “originalist logical space” can be represented by a matrix consisting of 72
distinct theses).
28
Id. at 5.
29
Id. at 5-6.
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Still, this Article maintains that, under the Take Care Clause,30
cases such as Medellín should never arise if the executive branch is
serious about its foreign affairs powers. That is, part of the job of
the executive is to make certain that the U.S. is in full compliance
with its international obligations. It must do so by taking whatever
measures are necessary and effective to assure that such
obligations are enforceable in domestic courts, wherever
international obligations require such enforcement. While the
Medellín Majority permits the State of Texas to determine the
foreign policy of the United States, the Supreme Court was in a
position to permit Texas to do so only because successive
presidential administrations lacked the political will to guarantee
that VCCR rights (as well as innumerable other rights created
under treaties ratified by the United States) are enforceable in U.S.
courts.
After a brief review of the background, facts and relevant
procedural history of Medellín in Part II of the Article, Part III
reviews the development of originalist doctrine, with a brief
discussion of the commitment to original meaning associated with
the positions of Justices Thomas and Scalia on the one hand and
the non-originalist Justices on the other. Part IV discusses the
Medellín opinions in the context of historical scholarship on the
meaning of the Supremacy Clause and the development of the
doctrine of self-execution. Part V offers a model for how the
political branches might reconcile a properly historicized31
approach to the Supremacy Clause32 and the Take Care Clause33
regardless of the Court’s views of the doctrine of self-execution.34

30

U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
For a historicist critique of originalism, see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 164-69 (1996);
Griffin, Rebotting Originalism, at 35-43.
32
U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2.
33
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
34
The opinion in Medellín also addresses the power of the President to direct
state courts to implement a decision of an international tribunal. On that subject,
the constitutional text provides only the most general guidance and so a
discussion of that part of the opinion would go beyond the scope of this Article.
31
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In brief, this Article argues that in order to avoid situations in
which congressional inaction or state opposition creates tensions
between U.S. obligations under international law and domestic
law, the President must take care to use political and legal means
to persuade Congress to make our international obligations
enforceable as domestic law wherever compliance with a treaty
demands congressional implementation.

II. THE MEDELLÍN CASE
On June 24, 1993, José Ernesto Medellín, a Mexican national
and a member of the “Black and Whites” street gang, participated
in an attack on two Houston teenagers, Jennifer Ertman and
Elizabeth Pena.35 Gang members raped the girls for over an hour
and then murdered them to prevent them from identifying their
attackers.36 Medellín himself strangled at least one of the girls
with her own shoelace.37 Medellín was arrested five days later.
Within hours of his arrest, he signed a written waiver and gave a
detailed written confession.38 Before he made this confession,
Medellín was advised of his Miranda rights. He was not advised
of his rights as a Mexican national under the VCCR to seek legal
advice from the Mexican consulate.39 Medellín was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death. In 1997, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld both Medellín’s conviction and his
sentence.40
Years later, while Medellín was on death row in Texas and his
petition for habeas corpus worked its way through the federal
courts,41 Mexico brought a case in the ICJ against the United States

That part of the opinion is the subject of a separate article, Medellín and the
State as Unitary Actor in International Legal Theory.
35
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1354.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
VCCR, Art. 36(1)(b); Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1353.
40
Id. at 1354-55.
41
Id. at 1355.
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on behalf of Medellín42 and other Mexican nationals who were
convicted in courts within the United States without being given
the access to consul provided for in the VCCR.43 This case, known
as Avena, was the third in a trilogy of cases brought before the ICJ
by states whose nationals were facing the death penalty in the
United States and who had been denied their VCCR rights.44
In the first case,45 brought in April 1998, Paraguay instituted
proceedings against the United States and sought a retrial of a
Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, who had been
sentenced to death in Virginia in 1993 but had been denied his
consular consultation rights in connection with his arrest and
prosecution for rape and murder.46 In 1996, Paraguay had also
attempted to use domestic legal mechanisms to prevent Breard’s
execution and to enjoin further violations of the VCCR.47 A
Virginia District Court found that it did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over Paraguay’s claims.48 The Fourth Circuit affirmed

42

Avena, 2004 I. C. J. Reports at 24-25, ¶ 16 (listing Medellín (#38) among
the Mexican nationals on whose behalf Mexico sought relief).
43
Id. at 12. The ICJ had jurisdiction over Avena pursuant to the Optional
Protocol to the VCCR, which the United States ratified together with the VCCR
itself in 1969, and which provides for jurisdiction in the ICJ for disputes arising
under the VCCR. Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1353. In response to the Avena
decision, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol. Letter from
Condaleeza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Kofi Annan, United Nations
Secretary-General, March 7, 2005, cited in Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1354.
44
See John F. Murphy, Medellín v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Decision for the United States and the Rule of Law in International
Affairs, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 253-259 (recounting litigation
relating to Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan sentenced to death for a
murder committed in Virginia, and Karl and Walter LaGrand, West Germans
sentenced to death for a murder committed in Arizona).
45
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) 1998 I.C.J. 249
(Application of the Republic of Paraguay of Apr. 3, 1998).
46
Jonathan Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92
AM. J. INT’L L. 666, 666-68 (1998).
47
Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F.Supp. 1269, 1272 (E.D. Va. 1996).
48
See id. at 1273 (finding that the Eleventh Amendment deprives the court of
subject-matter-jurisdiction over the relief sought by plaintiffs).
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on the same ground,49 and the Supreme Court refused to review
that decision.50
On April 9, 1998, the ICJ voted unanimously to indicate
provisional measures, directing the United States to ensure that
Breard was not executed prior to the ICJ’s final decision.51 The
response of the Clinton administration was ambivalent. On the one
hand, the Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of
Virginia urging the Governor not to allow Breard’s execution to
proceed.52 At the same time, the Clinton administration filed an
amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court urging the Court to deny
a writ of certiorari and a stay in Breard’s habeas petition on the
ground that the ICJ’s provisional measures are not binding on the
United States.53 By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court denied
Breard’s petition for habeas corpus and for certiorari on April 14,
1998.54 The Governor of Virgina refused to issue a stay of
execution,55 and Breard was executed that same day.56 Paraguay
eventually dropped its suit against the United States in the ICJ.57
Within months of Paraguay’s withdrawal of its suit, Germany
initiated a new action against the United States in the ICJ on behalf
of two of its nationals, Walter and Karl LaGrand, who were facing
49

See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit federal courts to provide
a remedy based on state officials’ past violations).
50
Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998).
51
Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v.
U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. Reports 248, 258 (Apr. 9, 1998).
52
See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 671-72
(quoting from Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to
James S. Gilmore III, Governor of Virginia (Apr. 13, 1998)).
53
See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 672-73
(quoting from Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49-51, Breard v.
Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998)).
54
Breard v. Greene, 118 S.Ct. at 1354.
55
See Charney & Reisman, Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. at 674-75
(quoting from Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of the Governor, Press Office,
Statement by Governor Jim Gilmore Concerning the Execution of Angel Breard
(Apr. 14, 1998)).
56
Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 257.
57
Id.
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execution for a murder committed in Arizona in 1982.58 Although
the LaGrands were tried and sentenced in 1984, the fact that they
had been denied their VCCR rights did not come to light until
1992.59 The Supreme Court denied their final habeas appeal in
November 1998,60 after the Ninth Circuit had rejected their VCCR
claim as procedurally defaulted.61 Karl LaGrand was executed on
February 23, 1999, before Germany was able to initiate its suit in
the ICJ.62
Germany acted in time to permit the ICJ to issue a provisional
measure to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand as scheduled
on March 3, 1999.63 Germany also had filed a suit in the U.S.
Supreme Court, but on the same day, the Court refused to exercise
its original jurisdiction in the case.64 Despite a recommendation
from Arizona’s Board of Executive Clemency that the Governor
grant a sixty-day reprieve to allow for the sorting out of issues
surrounding Germany’s ICJ case, Arizona Governor Jane Hull
ordered the execution to proceed as scheduled,65 and Walter was
executed later that evening.66
Unlike Paraguay, Germany decided to pursue its case before
the ICJ despite its inability to win a judgment that could benefit the
LaGrand brothers. Rather than seeking compensation for the harm
it suffered as a result of the U.S. breach of its VCCR obligations,
Germany sought assurances that further breaches would not
occur.67 The Court, for the most part, granted Germany the
58

See Bruno Simma & Carsten Hoppe, The LaGrand Case: A Story of Many
Miscommunications, in International Law Stories, 371, 380 (John E. Noyes, et
al. eds., 2007) (stating that Germany filed its application with the ICJ on March
2, 1999, the day before Walter LaGrand was scheduled to be executed).
59
Id. at 378.
60
LaGrand v. Stewart, 119 S.Ct. 422 (1998) (mem.).
61
LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998).
62
Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand Case, at 379-80.
63
Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 258.
64
F.R.G. v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1016, 1017 (1999).
65
Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand Case, at 380
66
Murphy, Medellín v. Texas, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 258.
67
LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), 2001 ICJ 466, 474, ¶ 12
(Judgment of June 27, 2001)
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remedy it sought, holding that the United States must allow review
and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of foreign
nationals who were denied their VCCR rights so as to take the
violation into account, but it left the choice of means for so doing
up to the United States.68
It came as no surprise when the ICJ, in the Avena case, found
that the United States had violated its obligations under the VCCR,
just as it had found in the LaGrand case.69 Mexico sought a ruling
from the ICJ ordering the United States to vacate the convictions
and sentences of Mexico’s nationals convicted and sentenced in
violation of the VCCR and suppression of any statement or
confessions made by those Mexican nationals prior to notification
of their VCCR rights.70 The ICJ opted for a more lenient penalty,
requiring U.S. courts to “review and reconsider” the convictions
and sentences of affected Mexican nationals to determine whether
they had been prejudiced by the U.S. breach of its treaty
obligations.71 The U.S. Supreme Court initially granted certiorari
to hear Medellín’s VCCR claim on habeas,72 but then dismissed
the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted in order to give
the Texas courts an opportunity to provide the review and
reconsideration called for in Avena.73
This was necessary because, while Medellín’s habeas petition
was pending before the Supreme Court, although the United States
disagreed with the Avena decision,74 President Bush issued a
68

Id. at 516, ¶ 128(7).
2004 I.C.J. Reports, at 53-55, ¶ 106. See Simma & Hoppe, The LaGrand
Case, at 388 (“The ICJ, faced with the same treaty and a substantially similar
situation as in LaGrand . . . produced a judgment that was, to nobody’s surprise,
very similar to its judgment in LaGrand.”).
70
2004 I.C.J. Reports, at 21, ¶ 13. Mexico also sought a ruling prohibiting the
United States from relying on any procedural penalty or any other domestic law
in denying relief to Mexican nationals affected by the decision. Id. at 21-22, ¶
13.
71
Id. at 72; Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1355.
72
Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2005)
73
Medellín v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005).
74
See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
69
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memorandum to the Attorney General, stating that the United
States would comply with the Avena judgment by directing state
courts to implement that judgment.75 In Medellín’s case, the Texas
criminal courts refused to do so. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals dismissed Medellín’s post-Avena habeas petition as an
abuse of the writ.76 The Texas court did not view either the Avena
decision or the President’s Memorandum as capable of displacing
state limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications.77
In Medellín v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed.78 In a
decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court concluded that
“neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes
directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on
the filing of successive habeas petitions.”79 In so doing, the
Medellín Majority found that the international obligations that
might render the Avena decision “directly enforceable federal law”
– the VCCR, its Optional Protocol and Article 94 of the United
Nations Charter – were non-self-executing treaties that had never
been implemented through congressional legislation.80
That the five-member conservative of the Court found that a
decision of the ICJ does not trump state law surprised few,
although some predicted that the Roberts Court, protective as it has
been of the President’s foreign affairs powers, would order Texas

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008), at 10, ¶ 6, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14592.pdf (last visited July 17, 2008).
75
See President’s Memorandum, supra note 4.
76
Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
77
Id.; Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356.
78
This holding, in and of itself, was not a surprise, given that the Court had
already held that states may apply the procedural default rule to bar VCCR
claims. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (2006).
79
Id. at 1357.
80
See id. (“Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in
the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no
such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not
automatically binding domestic law.”).
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to comply with President’s Memorandum.81 It is surprising that in
reaching that conclusion, the Majority devotes so little attention to
the original meaning of the constitutional text with regard to
whether and when international agreements should be given direct
effect as domestic law. More surprising still, the Majority devotes
very little attention to original meaning despite the fact that the
non-originalist dissenters cite to the work of legal scholars who
have explored the issue in great detail.82 While the Justices in the
Majority are free to be unpersuaded by the work of mere
academics, it is surprising that they do not even attempt to address
the overwhelming evidence of an original meaning to the
Supremacy Clause, enforced in dozens of cases listed in an

81

See Julian Ku, Medellín Gets Yet Another Day at the Supreme Court: This
Time
He
Should
Win,
Opinio
Juris
Blog,
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1192028188.shtml (Oct. 10, 2007) (last visited
June 11, 2008) (predicting that Medellín would prevail because of the
President’s memorandum directing states to implement the ICJ’s Avena
decision). Ku’s prediction was supported by his own scholarship and that of
others. See Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (2006) (contending that the President can implement
international tribunal judgments pursuant to executive foreign affairs powers);
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance
with ICJ Orders of Provisional Measures, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 679, 685-86 (1998)
(contending that the President, pursuant to the Constitution’s Take Care Clause,
could have ordered the effectuation of the ICJ’s provisional measures in the
Breard case and thus prevented Breard’s execution).
82
See supra, note 12 (citing the works of Carols Vázquez and Martin
Flaherty); see also Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571 (2007)). The dissenters, in
keeping with their refusal to embrace a principled originalism, do not base their
position solely on the original meaning of the Constitution. Rather, they also
argue for a historical tradition of giving direct domestic effect to treaties that
they are persuaded is consistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy
Clause. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). They also point
to caselaw relating to claims settlements in which Presidents used their Article II
power pursuant to a ratified treaty to set aside state law. Id. at 1390-91. The
Majority opinion does respond to the dissent’s arguments relating to claims
settlements. Id. at 1371-72.
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appendix to the dissenting opinion,83 at odds with the Majority’s
ruling.

III. ORIGINALISM AND THE MEDELLÍN OPINIONS
A. Varieties of Originalist
Interpretation

Approaches

to Constitutional

As an articulated theory of constitutional interpretation,
originalism is of rather recent vintage.84 However, originalism has
evolved, rapidly and with great contestation,85 and debates within
originalism have become extremely complicated.86 Generations of
scholars have now debated the original meaning of originalism.87
83

See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1392-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing 29
Supreme Court cases decided 1794 and 2004 in which the Court held a treaty to
be self-executing, 12 of which involved enforcement of a treaty despite contrary
state or territorial law or policy).
84
See, e.g., Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 12-13 (noting that various
contemporary methods of non-originalist constitutional interpretation are rooted
in traditions that extend back to the time of the adoption of the Constitution and
were employed by Justice John Marshall); Keith E. Whittington, The New
Origalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004) (conceding that, for much
of U.S. history, originalism “was not a terribly self-conscious theory of
constitutional interpretation”).
85
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4-8 (summarizing the development of
new originalism in the 1990s in response to the old originalism that arose in the
1960s); Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599
(describing the old originalism as having flourished from the 1960s thorough the
mid 1980s, while the new originalism has flourished since the early 1990s).
Randy Barnett provides a remarkably concise and authoritative history of
originalism. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L.
REV. 611, 611-13 (1999).
86
See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 4-5 (arguing
that originalism is so conflicted as to be incoherent).
87
See, e.g., Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original
Meaning, 86 GEO. L. J. 569 (1998) (criticizing Scalia’s view that originalism
must entail fidelity to original practices and proposing an originalism committed
to enforcing original principles embodied in the Constitution); Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent? 5 CONST. COMM. 77
(1989) (arguing that the Framers were “hospitable to the use of original intent in
the sense of ratifier intent, which is the original intent in a constitutional
sense”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 888 (1985) (arguing that the original version of “original
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The history of originalism has been recounted numerous times in
recent scholarship.88 Because the topic has been so exhaustively
covered elsewhere, a short summary is all that is called for here.
To the extent that originalism can be reduced to its core, it
consists of the view that “only certain sorts of historical evidence,
such as the understandings of constitutional meaning of the
Philadelphia framers or ratifiers of the Constitution, are legitimate
in constitutional interpretation.”89 Originalists and non-originalists
alike provide similar definitions.90 Parsimony is the key advantage
of originalism as a theory of constitutional adjudication: the

intent” focused not on the expectations of the framers but on the “rights and
powers sovereign polities could delegate to a common agent without destroying
their own essential autonomy,” making original intentionalism into a form of
structural interpretation).
88
Excellent, succinct summaries can be found in Thomas B. Colby, The
Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 529, 529-33 (2008); Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599-603; Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45
LOY. L. REV. at 611-29. Daniel Farber provides a concise narrative account of
early originalism in Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,
49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1095 (1989).
89
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 2.
90
See, e.g., Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 3 (“[O]riginalism maintains that
courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions solely in accordance with
some feature of those provisions’ original character.”); Farber, The Originalism
Debate, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. at 1086 (“Originalists are committed to the view that
original intent is not only relevant but authoritative, that we are in some sense
obligated to follow the intent of the framers.”); Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980)
(defining originalism as the “approach to constitutional adjudication that accords
binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its
adopters”); Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 851-52 (describing the
“originalist” approach to constitutional interpretation as seeking to establish the
meaning of the Constitution in 1789 based on the Constitution’s text and overall
structure as well as the contemporaneous understanding of the relevant text);
Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV.
211, 220-21 (1988) (describing textualists such as Robert Bork as treating “the
constitutional text as the sole legitimate source of operative norms of
constitutional law”).

Running Head

21

judge’s role is to discover the original meaning of the Constitution
and rule in accordance with that meaning.91
Originalism began as a response to the Warren and Burger
Courts.92 Just as romantic conservatism evolved as a response to
enlightenment rationalism,93 and just as modern conservatism in
the United States emerged as a response to the perceived excesses
of progressive movements from Roosevelt’s New Deal to the
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society,94 originalism was “a reactive
theory”95 that sought to reign in judicial activism by forcing
judicial attention to the original meaning of the Constitution.96 As
such, the old originalism had a clear political agenda,97 and it
assumed that its agenda could be realized if judges respected the
wills of legislatures.98 That assumption now seems oddly
91

See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 2 (“to
originalists, it is the relative predictability, determinacy and coherence of the
originalist approach that both respects law and constrains judges.”).
92
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4; Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living
Constitutionalism, at 5.
93
See H.G. SCHENK, THE MIND OF THE EUROPEAN ROMANTICS 3-8 (1966)
(characterizing romanticism as a “reaction against rationalism”).
94
See GEORGE NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA SINCE 1945 xii (1976) (defining American post-war conservatism as
being animated by “resistance to certain forces perceived to be leftist,
revolutionary and profoundly subversive of what conservatives at the time
deemed worth cherishing, defending and perhaps dying for”); Jonathan Rieder,
The Rise of the “Silent Majority,” in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL
ORDER 243, 244 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds., 1989) (attributing the rise
of populist conservatism to feelings of resentment, betrayal and unhappiness
with the cultural and political changes in American society from the New Deal
to the civil rights movement).
95
See Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 601
(“It is important to note that originalism was a reactive theory motivated by
substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren
and Burger Courts.”); id. at 604 (“As a reactive and critical posture, the old
originalism thrived only in opposition.”).
96
Id.
97
Keith Whittington concludes that the old originalists were “primarily
concerned with empowering popular majorities” (id. at 602), which also entailed
upholding government power. Id. at 602-03, n. 21.
98
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 4, 18 (2d ed. 1997)
(lamenting the Warren Court’s reading of “its libertarian convictions into the
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misplaced, since originalist Justices have proven themselves at
least as willing to strike down legislation as non-originalist
Justices.99
In its first iteration, originalism focused on the intentions of the
Constitution’s framers or ratifiers, as the best source that
interpreters ought to rely on if a constitutional provision is not
clear.100 But two scholars effectively demolished the original
intentions approach101 by demonstrating: first, the implausibility of
reconstructing the original intentions of the framers;102 and second,
the framers’ reluctance to have interpretations of the Constitution
depend on claimed knowledge of their original intentions.103
Fourteenth Amendment” and claiming that is has, through its reading of that
Amendment exceeded its power by rewriting the Constitution); ROBERT BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 109 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court has usurped the powers of
the American people and their representatives and pursuit of left-wing policymaking).
99
See KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 40, Table 2.1 (2004) (indicating that,
on an annual basis, between 1995 and 2003, the Rehnquist Court struck down
far more federal statutes on constitutional grounds than did the supposedly
activist Burger and Warren Courts); id. at 268 (stating that Justices Rehnquist,
Thomas and Scalia all support judicial activism when they believe the original
Constitution calls for it); Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of
Amateur History, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT
DYANMIC 70, 87 (Earl M. Maltz, ed. 2003) (noting that Justice Thomas
“exhibits no tendency to defer to local or national legislators”).
100
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4.
101
See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 6 (stating
that original intent theory met with “savage criticism” which exposed its two
fundamental weaknesses); Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L.
REV. at 612 (describing the original intentions approach as having been
“trounced” by its critics); id. at 613 (“If ever a theory had a stake driven through
its heart, it seems to be originalism.”).
102
See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, 60 B.U. L. REV. at 222 (concluding that
an “interpreter’s understanding of original understanding may be so
indeterminate as to undermine the rationale for originalism” in the case of many
controversial constitutional provisions”).
103
See Powell, Original Understanding, 98 HARV. L. REV. at 906-07 (pointing
out the Federalists’ view that the intentions of the drafters of the Constitution
would not be legally relevant because they were “mere scriveners” appointed to
draft an instrument for the people).
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Originalism, now called “new originalism” quickly overcame these
objections by shifting from a focus on intention to a focus on the
public meaning of the constitutional text as adopted – that is, on
the meaning that the text would have for an ordinary 18th-century
reader.104 This shift is especially significant for the purposes of
this Article because Justice Scalia was one of the earliest advocates
of the shift from subjective intention to textual meaning.105
The new originalism has expanded beyond the reactive
gestures of the old originalism. It no longer seeks to hold the
judiciary in check.106 Rather, it recognizes that originalism might
require “the active exercise of the power of judicial review in order
to keep faith with the principled commitments of the founding.”107
Moreover, originalism is no longer tethered to a political agenda: it
seeks not to criticize an overreaching court but to engage

104

Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609.
See Colby & Smith, Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism, at 6 (citing
Scalia’s “campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to
the Doctrine of Original Meaning”); Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. at 9 (“Justice Scalia was perhaps the first defender of originalism to shift
the theory from its previous focus on the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution to the original public meaning of the text at the time of its
enactment.”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Intepretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 554-55 (2003), (crediting Justice Scalia with the suggestion,
accepted by most originalists, to change the label of the doctrine from original
intent to original meaning).
106
See, e.g., KECK, MOST ACTIVIST COURT, at 268 (indicating that the
Rehnquist Court’s originalists were not averse to activism in support of their
originalism); Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, at 71
(noting that Thomas “would overrule a remarkable number of cases, some
dating back more than two hundred years, in the name of originalism.”); David
R. Dow, et al., Judicial Activism on the Rehnquist Court: An Empirical
Assessment, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEG. COMM. 35, 71 (2008) (providing a statistical
breakdown of the Justices’ votes on an issue-by-issue basis and concluding that
“Justice Scalia votes to thwart the majority in cases where the majoritarian view
ought to rule”); Tracy A. Thomas, Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s
Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 73, 132 & n.408 (2007) (noting
that the Court’s remedies jurisprudence supports the views of those who
characterize the Rehnquist court as an activist court and citing numerous
scholars who have so argued).
107
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609.
105
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previously unexplored aspects of our constitutional history.108
New originalism has also developed a body of normative theory to
justify reliance on original meaning.109
Still, the new originalism has much in common with the old
originalism. Like the old originalism, the new originalism
“regards the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time
of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional
interpretation in the present.”110 New originalists concede some of
the criticisms of original intent originalism, but claim that such
criticisms are largely irrelevant to their own version of
originalism.111 This claim is not entirely convincing for, as critics
of the new originalism have pointed out, the sources that new
originalists use to demonstrate original public meaning tend to be
the same sources that old originalists used to demonstrate original
intentions.112 At least some new originalists concede this point.113
108

See id. at 608, (noting Randy Barnett’s research into the origins of the
commerce clause, Barnett and Don Kates’ research on the origins of the Second
Amendment, John Yoo’s originalist approach to war powers and Steven
Calebresi and Christopher Yoo’s article on the historical origins of the concept
of a unitary executive).
109
See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 110-59 (1999) (developing
a defense of originalism based on a version of popular sovereignty that he dubs
“potential sovereignty”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The
Desirable Constitution and the Case for Originalism, Northwestern Public Law
Research Paper No. 08-05, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1109247
(last visited July 2, 2008) (providing a consequentialist defense of originalism);
Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 629-43 (developing
a defense of originalism based on principles that inform doctrines in contract
law such as the statute of frauds and the parole evidence rule).
110
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 599.
111
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 94-95 (2004) (noting that early critics of originalism,
such as Paul Brest and H. Jefferson Powell “left considerable room for
originalism,” understood in this context as textualism rather than intentionalism,
“to flourish”). For an earlier iteration of the same arguments, see Barnett,
Originalism for Non-Originalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 623-29 (reconciling the
views of Brest and Powell with the new originalism).
112
See, e.g., SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 79, n.1 (2007) (“The distinction
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More generally, scholars have begun to suggest that
originalism can be reconciled with its theoretical nemesis,114 which
has been variously characterized as living constitutionalism115 (my
preferred
term),
non-originalism,116
pluralism,117
and
developmental theory.118 In one sense, we are all originalists to the
between intention and meaning is a refinement that cuts no ice with us.”);
Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power, 80 TEMP. L. REV. at 261, n. 106 (noting
that textualist and intentionalist approaches are not as divergent as they may
appear, since practitioners of both approaches rely on the same sources of
information to establish the meaning of the Constitution); Nelson, Originalism
and Intepretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. at 556-58 (pointing out that
original intent and original meaning most likely align in most cases and where
they do not, modern readers are not well positioned to discern original
meaning); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 375, n. 130 (1981) (“[T]he difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the
ratifiers leaves little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair
reflection of it.”).
113
See Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y at 609610 (noting that the history of the constitutional drafting process can provide
useful information about how the text was understood at the time and the
significance of specific language that was included in or excluded from the
document); Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. at 617
(remarking that the distinction between textualism and originalism is hard to
maintain).
114
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMM. 427, 428 (2007) (contending that living
constitutionalists need not be and should not be non-originalists, since
originalism means fidelity to the Constitution’s text and its principles); Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 292 (2007)
(contending that the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism
rests on a false dichotomy). See also Colby & Smith, at 5 (arguing that
originalists, in their internal debates, have produced their own version of living
constitutionalism).
115
Balkin, Original Meaning, at 428 (identifying himself both an originalist
and a living constitutionalist).
116
Id. (calling non-originalism a form of living constitutionalism), but see
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 3 (“[T]he alternative to originalism is not
‘nonoriginalism,” but rather traditional or conventional constitutional
interpretation, which features a variety of forms, modes or methods.”). But
Griffin acknowledges that the division of scholars into originalism and
nonoriginalism remains widespread. Id. at 8-9 notes 41-45.
117
STEPHEN GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 143-52 (1996)
118
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 4.
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extent that we must at least in some circumstances care about what
constitutional language meant at the time it was drafted rather than
what it might mean to us now. For example, the Guarantee
Clause119 makes reference to “domestic Violence.” As Jack Balkin
points out, in the 18th century, that phrase meant “riots or
disturbances within a state,” while today we associate the phrase
with “assaults and batteries by intimates or by persons living
within the same household.”120 It would be absurd to seek to
change in our constitutional order simply because of change in
linguistic usage.121 Similarly, living constitutionalists have not
sought to impose a more modern meaning of the Constitution’s
requirement that the President be 35 years of age, despite the fact
that one could argue that the Framers simply intended that the
President be a person of mature years.122 Indeed, there are no
scholars who would argue that the original meaning of the
Constitution is irrelevant to debates about its contemporary
meaning.123

119

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
Balkin, Original Meaning, at 430.
121
See id. at 429-32 (arguing for a form of originalism, compatible with living
constitutionalism in which legal meaning is preserved).
122
U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24
CONST. COMM. at 305 (noting that his underlying principles approach to
constitutional interpretation does not override the textual command when the
text is “relatively rule-like, concrete and specific”).
123
See, e.g., YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, at 25 (noting that academics
differ over how much deference to accord the Framers, not over whether or not
they are due any deference at all); Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, at 10
(“Scholars today distinguish among forms of originalism, not between
originalism and nonoriginalism.”); Farber, The Originalism Debate, 49 OHIO ST.
L. J. at1086 (“Almost no one believes that the original understanding is wholly
irrelevant to modern-day constitutional interpretation.”). Eric Posner briefly
posed as an exception to this general rule. See Posner, “The Founders,” Opinio
Juris Blog, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1187656698.shtml (Aug. 21, 2007)
(last visited July 10, 2008) (“If academics on both sides of the issue could agree
to debate the presidency, emergency powers, and the constitution without
mentioning the framers, this alone would count as progress.”). But even Posner
cannot resist reference to the framers as authority. See Posner, “The President
Versus
the
Presidency,”
Opinio
Juris
Blog,
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1187708614.shtml (Aug. 21, 2007) (last visited
120
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Just as there are limits to living constitutionalism, most
originalists also acknowledge limits to their own principles of
constitutional interpretation.124 Living constitutionalists are not
distinct from originalists because they pay no attention to the
original meaning of the Constitution. What separates living
constitutionalists from originalists is the extent to which they are
willing to incorporate interpretive materials other than literal
original meaning into their understanding of what the Constitution
demands of us today.
B. Originalism and the Practice of the Medellín Court
Neither the nor the dissenting opinions in Medellín are
originalist opinions. As explained in Part IV, Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion is true neither to the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause nor to the early precedents, on which the
opinion purports to rely, regarding the extent to which treaties
must be given direct effect as binding U.S. law. Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion takes the constitutional text and the early
precedents more seriously, but he does so, appropriately enough,
within the context of a broader appreciation of constitutional text,
structure and history, as one would expect from a Justice
committed to a version of living constitutionalism. It is not
inconsistent for a living constitutionalist to pay close attention to
the original meaning of the constitutional text.125
However, as originalism comes in many variations, perhaps we
should not be too hasty in criticizing the originalist Justices for
signing off on Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Scalia
describes himself as a “faint-hearted originalist”126 and
July 10, 2008) (commenting “oops!” on his own invocation of the founders as
authority for his view of presidential power but invoking them nonetheless).
124
See, e.g., Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 864 (conceding that
he would not uphold a statute calling for the punishment of flogging even if such
a statute would have been permissible in 1789).
125
See Berman, Originalism is Bunk, at 22 (stating that non-originalism
regards original meaning as relevant to judicial interpretation but that postratification facts can also bear on interpretation).
126
Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 864 (“I hasten to confess that
in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”). More recently, in
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acknowledges that there are problems with originalist
methodology.127 For example, Justice Scalia recognizes that the
originalist enterprise really requires training in historical research,
a task for which most judges are ill-prepared.128 Even a
professional historian would need more time to undertake the
originalist task properly than a judge typically has to decide a
case.129
In the end, however, Scalia defends his originalism based on
his view that a “thing worth doing is worth doing badly.”130 Justice
Scalia neglects to note the source of his motto. It is from a chapter
in Gilbert Chesterton’s 1910 book What’s Wrong with the World,
in which Chesterton advocates separate and decidedly distinct
education for women.131 One of Chesterton’s themes was the
importance of maintaining the distinction between “specialists”
and amateurs, or what he calls mankind’s “comrade-like aspect.”132
He supported an educated amateurism, especially for women,133
but his advice, quoted by Justice Scalia, was meant to guide people
explaining that he would not undo all precedents associated with a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional interpretation, Scalia proclaimed, “I am a
textualist. I am an originalist. I am not a nut.” National Public Radio,
Interviews:
Scalia
Defends
a
“Dead”
Constitution,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526
(Apr.
28,
2008) (last visited June 12, 2008)
127
See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 856 (noting that
originalism is “not without its warts”).
128
Id. at 856-57. See also Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition,
99 YALE L. J. 1419, 1420 (1999) (criticizing Bork’s originalism on the ground
that his constitutional vision is “radically ahistorical”).
129
See id. at 860 (noting that it might take a longer time and more pages than
are usually available to a judge to flesh out even a minor point “in a fasion that a
serious historian would consider minimally adequate”).
130
Id. at 863.
131
GILBERT CHESTERTON, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE WORLD 314-320 (1910).
The passage that Justice Scalia quotes appears on page 320, at the end of the
chapter “Folly and Female Education.”
132
See id. at 130-31 (citing as “the peculiar period of our time” the “eclipse of
comradeship and equality by specialism and domination”).
133
See id. at 319-20 (describing the product of his preferred, old-fashioned
education as “maintaining the bold equilibrium of inferiorities which is the most
mysterious of superiorities and perhaps the most unattainable”).
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in their pursuit of hobbies, not in their professional lives. As one
Chesterton authority put it, Chesterton’s advice was intended to
apply to activities such as writing one’s own love letters and
blowing one’s own nose.134 More generally, Chesterton urged
people to engage in all sorts of amateurism, as he believed that an
energetic engagement in hobbies and leisure activities were the
crucial to human being. However, he did not refuse to recognize
any social role for the specialist whatsoever. He did not advocate
amateurism when it came to playing the organ or serving as Royal
Astronomer.135 In short, Justice Scalia’s motto does not inspire
confidence when applied to a brain surgeon, a mechanical engineer
or a federal judge. If one cannot have any confidence that judges
can do a good job of discerning original meaning, there is no
reason to base constitutional interpretation on that hopeless
endeavor.
Moreover, Justice Scalia acknowledges that there really is
much less difference between his “faint-hearted” originalism and
non-originalism.136 This is indeed a theme on which critics of
originalism have picked up.137 But it is not clear where this leaves
Scalia’s originalism. He insists that he remains an originalist.138
134

Quotemeister, The American Chesterton Society, available at
http://chesterton.org/qmeister2/doingbadly.htm (last visited August 7, 2008).
135
See id. (“There are things like playing the organ or discovering the North
Pole, or being Astronomer Royal, which we do not want a person to do at all
unless he does them well.”).
136
See Scalia, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. at 862 (acknowledging that
“there is really no difference between the faint-hearted originalist and the
moderate nonoriginalist” and that “most originalists are faint-hearted and most
nonoriginalists are moderate.”).
137
Paul Brest, one of the earliest and most effective critics of originalism,
echoes Justice Scalia:
The only difference between moderate originalism and
nonoriginalist adjudication is one of attitude toward the text
and original understanding. For the moderate originalist, these
sources are conclusive when they speak clearly. For the
nonoriginalists, they are important but not determinative.
Brest, The Misconceived Quest, 60 B.U. L. REV. at 229.
138
See National Public Radio, Interviews: Scalia Defends a “Dead”
Constitution, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526
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Yet some originalists maintain that he is not.139 He certainly
invokes originalism when criticizing his fellow Justices’ handling
of a particular case, but in Medellín, he blithely signed off on an
opinion that was not merely non-originalist but anti-originalist –
that is, an opinion willfully blind to the meaning of the Supremacy
Clause.
Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” version of originalism might
permit of the type of reasoning followed by the Medellín dissent,
but because the Majority opinion ignores the strong originalist
arguments of the dissenting Justices, it is hard to see the Majority
opinion as anything other than a renunciation of originalism as an
approach to the Supremacy Clause. David Schulz and Christopher
Smith argue that, despite Scalia’s professed originalism,
“ideological factors influence how Scalia reads what the framers
meant or what he claims the framers meant.”140 This would seem
to be the case in Medellín, as the Majority opinion cannot be
reconciled with even a faint-hearted version of originalism.
In any case, the Majority opinion cannot be reconciled with the
stricter originalism espoused by Justice Thomas.141 However, a
review of Justice Thomas’s voting record suggests that he is less a
consistent originalist than he is a consistent conservative.142 The
foremost commentator on Justice Thomas’s version of originalism
contends that Thomas alternates between two versions of
originalism (which yield different results) depending on the nature

(Apr. 28, 2008) (last visited June 12, 2008) (quoting Scalia describing himself as
an originalist and a textualist).
139
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. at 13 (concluding that Justice
Scalia is not an originalist)
140
DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
VISION OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 41 (1996).
141
See Christopher E. Smith & Cheryl D. Lema, Justice Clarence Thomas and
Incommunicado Detention: Justifications and Risks: 39 VAL. L. REV. 783, 792
(2005) (“More so than any other contemporary justice, Thomas consistently
advocates the strict application of key tools for interpreting the constitution: its
text and history.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
142
See id. at 784 (characterizing Thomas as the most conservative sitting
Justice).
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of the case.143 It is not at all unusual for the Court’s originalists to
let their political commitments trump those of originalism.144
Indeed, the Court’s self-proclaimed originalists are among the
most consistently conservative Supreme Court Justices over the
past 70 years.145
And so, Medellín is best understood as a political decision
rather than one grounded in either the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause or even in the meaning of that Clause as
reflected in subsequent legal precedent. Indeed, it seems a
decision that simply accords with the Majority’s skeptical views
regarding the extent to which the United States should be bound by
its international commitments.

IV. MEDELLÍN AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE
Gordon Wood, recognized as “one of the leading historians of
the early republic,”146 suggests that “most of the means by which
143

See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 193 (1999) (summarizing Thomas’s jurisprudence as liberal
originalism with respect civil rights and conservative originalism on civil
liberties and federalism).
144
See, e.g., Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, at 71
(noting that Thomas always sides with conservative historians whenever there is
a disagreement among historians and that he jettisons originalism entirely when
doing so serves conservative interests).
145
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior:
A
Statistical
Study,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403 (April 2008) (last
visited July 13, 2008), manuscript at 46 (ranking Justice Thomas first and Scalia
third among 43 Justices on the Court from 1937-2006 in terms of their tendency
to vote with the more conservative justices in non-unanimous cases); see also
SCHULTZ & SMITH, JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION, at xvi (labeling Scalia a
“consistent conservative” based on empirical studies of his voting behavior
while also noting a handful of cases in which Scalia surprised observers by
siding with the more liberal Justices).
146
Griffin, Originalism Rebooted, at 26. See also Saikrishna B. Prakash &
John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEORGE WASH. L.
REV. 354, 365 (2003) (heralding Wood as one of two leading intellectual
historians of the early national period); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional
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we carry on our governmental business” such as the cabinet,
administrative agencies, the political parties and judicial review,
are “unmentioned in the Constitution and are the products of
historical experience.”147 One would thus expect originalism to
apply, if at all, only in the limited contexts in which the
constitutional text in some way establishes or at least delimits the
boundaries of our political institutions. From this perspective,
originalism may make less (or even less) sense in the realm of
treaty law than it does in other realms of constitutional law.
Very few aspects of the constitutional design with respect to
treaties have been realized in our practice. For example, although
the Constitution provides that the President may make a treaty “by
and with” the Senate’s “advice and consent,”148 the Senate has not
fulfilled its advisory capacity since the time of President
Washington.149 More strikingly still, although the Constitution
provides only one mechanism, the Treaty Clause, through which
the United States may enter into international agreements, the
political branches frequently bypass the rather onerous Article II

Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1646-47 (2002) (listing Wood’s Creation of the
American Republic among the leading secondary works on the framing period);
Flaherty, History Right?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. at 2103, n. 38 (reporting the results
of an unscientific “poll” that found Wood to be the historian most cited in law
reviews).
147
Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, 33, 39-40 (Feb. 18, 1988).
See also Keith E. Whittington,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
MEANING 12 (1999) (listing 87 examples of “constitutional constructions,” that
is processes whereby our constitutional systems evolves, develops or takes
practical effect through governing structures and policies without formal
amendment judicial constitutional interpretation).
148
U.S. Const., art. II, §2, ¶ 2.
149
See Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power, 80 TEMP. L. REV. at 282 (noting
that President Washington originally thought that the Senate had constitutional
power to advise the President on treaty negotiation); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545, 631, 634 (2004) (noting that the Framers as well as both the Senate
and the President during Washington first administration understood the
Constitution to provide the Senate with advisory power before treaties were
finalized).
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requirements of advise and consent by two-thirds of the Senate,150
choosing instead to commit the United States to international
agreements through executive-legislative agreements or through
sole executive agreements.151 Indeed, in recent decades, nearly
90% of the United States’ international obligations arise through
mechanisms other than Article II treaties.152 Oona Hathaway has
recently suggested that the United States jettison treaties entirely
(or nearly entirely) in favor of the extra-constitutional alternatives,
as there is no principled reason for why our government enters into
international obligations through one method or the other and
congressional-executive agreements are more likely to be adhered
to.153
Nonetheless, as the dissenting Justices suggest, the
Constitution does provide guidance on the extent to which treaties
are supreme law, enforceable in domestic courts. Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion proceeds as if the Constitution were silent on this
issue, but as the concluding section of this Part will show, the
original meaning of the Supremacy Clause strongly favors a
presumption in favor of according treaties the status of supreme,
self-executing federal law. The Majority’s decision to ignore
original meaning in this instance and to favor state law over the
international obligations of the United States raises unnecessary
barriers to the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches
of the federal government.

150

U.S. const. Art. II, § 2 ¶ 2.
Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1238 (2008)
(noting that the United States makes binding international agreements through
two separate processes, one of which is laid out in the Constitution and one that
is not).
152
Id. at 1258, 1260 (listing by category 375 treaties and 2744 congressionalexecutive agreements entered into by the United States between 1980 and 2000).
153
Id. at 1241 (stating that “nearly everything that is done through the Treaty
Clause can and should be done through congressional-executive agreements”).
151
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A. The Sources of Chief Justice Roberts’ Opinion in Medellín
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in the Medellín case has been
widely praised as “careful” and “modest.”154 It is neither. Because
the Court could easily have found that the trial court’s decision
dismissing Medellín’s habeas petition on the merits155 complied
with the “review and reconsideration” called for in the Avena
decision,156 the petition for certiorari was inprovidently granted.
The Medellín opinion was thus offered in violation of the “last
resort rule,” according to which “a federal court should refuse to
rule on a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on a
nonconstitutional basis.”157

154

See, e.g., Kent Scheidegger, Medellín Discussion Board: The Ball Is in
Congress’s
Court,
SCOTUSBlog
(Mar.
27,
2008),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-the-ball-is-incongresss-court/#more-6908, last visited May 27, 2008 (finding the holding in
Medellín “not all that remarkable.”); Richard Samp, Medellín Discussion Board:
The Court Defers to Congress, SCOTUSBlog (Mar. 25,2008),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/medellin-discussion-board-the-court-defers-tocongress/, last visited May 27, 2008 (discerning a show of humility in the
Majority’s expressed willingness to defer to Congress if it were to pass
legislation calling for the implementation of Avena); Paul Stephan, Medellín v.
Texas: “Modest and Fairly Careful,” Opinio Juris Blog (Mar. 25, 2008)
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206470637.shtml, last visited May 27, 2008
(tentatively concluding that “Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court is
modest and fairly careful”); Julian Ku, Medellín: My Early Thoughts, Opinio
Juris Blog (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1206464651.shtml,
last visited May 27, 2008 (calling the Majority opinion “fairly sensible and
reasonable”).
155
See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1355, n.1 (noting the trial court’s finding that
Medellín had not been prejudiced by the United States’ failure to grant him his
consular consultation rights under the VCCR because the VCCR only requires
notice of such rights within three days of arrest and Medellín had confessed
within three hours).
156
2004 ICJ Rep. at 72.
157
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV.
1003, 1004 (1994). Chief Justice Roberts himself recently invoked the doctrine,
calling it a “fundamental rule of judicial restraint” and noting that “[o]ur
precedents have long counseled us to avoid deciding . . . hypothetical questions
of constitutional law” unless such questions are unavoidable. Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S.Ct. at 2281-82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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In its brief for the Court, the State of Texas urged the Court to
dismiss the case on the basis that the trial court’s finding that
Medellín had not been prejudiced satisfied the ICJ’s requirement
of review and reconsideration.158 During oral argument, Justice
Kennedy voiced some sympathy for Texas’s position on this
matter.159 Athough the ruling of the Texas court is patently absurd,
if the Court agreed that Texas had already granted the necessary
review and reconsideration, it should have ruled on that subconstitutional basis. If it disagreed, the Court should have taken
the opportunity to point out that while a criminal defendant who
confesses to the police is unlikely to be acquitted, that confession
in no way precludes a well-counseled defendant from presenting
mitigating evidence that would make the imposition of the death
penalty unlikely. Thus, for example, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals recognized that Osbaldo Torres, another
Mexican national whose interests were at issue in the Avena case,
suffered prejudice with respect to his capital sentence even though
he was not prejudiced with regard to his conviction for first-degree
murder.160
The substantive portion161 of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
begins by acknowledging that Medellín relies on the Supremacy
Clause.162 Without any discussion of the founding documents
pertaining to the Supremacy Clause or of any of the historical
158

Brief for Respondent, at 49-50, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008)
(No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2428387.
159
See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 20, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346
(2008) (No. 06-984), 2007 WL 2945736 (“And I have a problem, incidentally,
because I think Medellin did receive all the hearing that he's entitled to under the
judgment anyway.”).
160
Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1189 (Okla. Crim 2005). See John F.
Murphy, Medellín v. Texas: Implications of the Supreme Court’s Decision for
the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31 SUFF.
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 260-61 (detailing the commutation of Torres’ death
sentence by Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry and Torres’ unsuccessful attempt
to gain further relief from the courts).
161
Part I of the opinion introduces the relevant treaty law and recites the facts
and procedural history of the case. Medellín, 128 S.Ct at 1353-56. Only in Part
II does Justice Roberts begin to set out the applicable substantive U.S. law.
162
Id. at 1356
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scholarship discussing the original meaning and purpose of the
Supremacy Clause, the Chief Justice proceeds directly to a
discussion of the distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties.163 It is hard to see what is “careful” about an
opinion that interprets a constitutional provision, the Supremacy
Clause, without more that a meager reference to it, its legislative
history, or the substantial body of scholarship pertaining to its
original meaning. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts’ Medellín opinion
ignores the plain meaning of the constitutional text, relies on a few
Supreme Court cases while ignoring others, 164 as well as dozens of
other federal cases that suggest a presumption in favor of selfexecution, and then mis-applies the few cases on which he
purportedly relies.
The doctrine of self-execution is not of constitutional origin.165
Rather it is an invention of the Marshall Court.166 The authority
cited in the Majority opinion for the doctrine of self-execution
consists of several cases,167 one of which cites to one passage from
The Federalist Papers,168 and the Restatement (3d) of U.S. Foreign
163

Id.
See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1392-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing an
appendix listing Supreme Court cases, most of which are not cited by the
Majority, in which treaties were held to be self-executing).
165
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. 760, 760 (1988)
(arguing that the distinction created in caselaw between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties “is patently inconsistent with the express language” of the
Supremacy Clause); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1233
(characterizing the idea of non-self-executing treaties as “judicially created”).
According to Paust, the phrase “self-executing” did not appear in a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion until 1887 in Bartram v. Robertson. Paust, SelfExecuting Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 766.
166
See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. at 700 (“The distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was introduced into U.S.
jurisprudence by the Supreme Court in Foster v. Neilson.”).
167
See Medellín, at 1356-57 (citing, in order of citation: Foster v. Neilson, 2
Pet. 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet.
51 (1833); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Igartúa-De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); and the Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
168
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357. The appeal to the authority of The Federalist
Papers is only for Hamilton’s rather ambiguous comparison between laws that

164
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Relations Law.169 In explaining its views on the doctrine, the
Majority notes, in a manner that is neither enlightening nor tending
to inspire confidence in the strength of the precedent on which the
Court purports to be relying, that various courts have understood
the doctrine of self execution differently.170 The Majority explains
that it understands “self-execution” to mean that a “treaty has
individuals are “bound to observe” as “the supreme law of the land” and a “mere
treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties.” Id., citing THE FEDERALIST
No. 33, 207 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961). Since Federalist No. 33 deals with the
taxing power and the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is unclear
that it has any relevance to the doctrine of self-execution at all. In context, it
seems that Hamilton’s true purpose is to contrast a law with a mere pact between
private parties.
169
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357, n. 3, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986)
170
See Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356, n.2 (“The label ‘self-executing’ has on
occasion been used to convey different meanings.”). A more interesting
discussion of federal courts’ problematic handling of what it means to call a
treaty self-execution or non-self-executing can be found in the scholarly
literature. As the dissent notes (128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting), at
least one scholar has argued that the doctrine of self-execution is not the best
way to explain case law on the judicial enforcement of treaties. See Tim Wu,
Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 573-74 (2007) (arguing that the best
guide to whether a court will enforce a treaty is the identity of the entity alleged
to have violated the treaty and concluding that courts are most likely to enforce
treaties violated by state governments and more likely to defer to decisions of
the political branches of the federal government to violate a treaty). See also
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and Presumption of Self-Execution, forthcoming in 121 HARV. L. REV. (2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118063 (last
visited July 14, 2008), manuscript at 3, n. 8 (noting that “self-executing” can
mean that a treaty is “addressed to” the legislature, although it could also mean
“addressed to” the executive, and in that case the Presidents Memorandum (see
supra, note 4) is adequate execution); Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. at 696-97 (identifying four distinct grounds on which a court might
conclude that legislative action is necessary before it can enforce a treaty);
Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 775-81 (criticizing courts for
straying from the original meaning and from Justice Marshall’s method of treaty
interpretation in positing that some treaties must be non-self-executing if their
implementation requires an exercise of congressional power); Yuji Iwasawa,
The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States, 26 VA. J. INT’L L.
627, 635-42 (1986) (summarizing differing positions staked out by courts and in
legal scholarship on the possible meanings of the doctrine of self execution).
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automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification,”171 but
it does not ground its understanding of the doctrine in precedent,
history or logic. Instead, relying on a handful of cases decided
over a nearly 175-year span, the Court concludes that a treaty is
only self-executing – that is, that a treaty has domestic effect as
federal law upon ratification – only if it “contains stipulations
which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make
them operative.”172 The Court thus subtly changes the rule laid
down by Justice Marshall which, consistent with the Supremacy
Clause, provided that treaties are presumed to be self-executing
unless the parties to the treaty stipulate otherwise173 into a
presumption against self-execution absent a contrary provision.
Having established the status of treaties as domestic law
without any analysis of the Supremacy Clause, the Chief Justice
then proceeds to a discussion of the treaties at issue. The Optional
Protocol, he concludes, is a “bare grant of jurisdiction” which
“does not itself commit signatories to comply with an ICJ
judgment.”174 The key language of the U.N. Charter provides that
each Member “undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ]
in any case to which it is a party.”175 Chief Justice Roberts reasons
that this provision cannot be self-executing because the “sole
171

Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1356, n.2.
Id. at 1357, citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. at 194. Justice Breyer
points out in dissent that it is absurd to expect a multilateral treaty to address the
issue of self-execution, as some states automatically incorporate treaties into
domestic law. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381, 1383 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
also Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 709 (“Perhaps because of
the diversity of domestic-law rules on the subject, nations negotiating treaties
rarely address matters of domestic implementation.”); Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM J. INT’L L. at 771 (criticizing Justice Marshall’s approach to the
question of the domestic effect of treaties given that parties to a treaty “rarely
concern themselves with the details of domestic implementation”); Iwasawa,
Self-Executing Treaties, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 627at 654 (noting that parties
negotiating a treaty rarely concern themselves with the treaty’s domestic validity
and thus it is “very rare” to find a treaty that indicates whether a treaty –
especially a multilateral treaty – is to be self-executing).
173
See United States v. Perchemen, 7 Pet. at 88-89 (finding a treaty selfexecuting where it does not stipulate to the need for some future legislative act).
174
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1358.
175
U.N. CHARTER, Art. 94(1).
172
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remedy for noncompliance”176 provided by the Charter is “referral
to the United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state.”177
The Chief Justice also finds some support for this reading of the
U.N. Charter in the Senate hearings on the ratification of the
Charter, and he treats that evidence as decisive.178 Reliance on
176

Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359 (emphasis added).
Id., quoting U.N.CHARTER, Art. 94(2). Justice Breyer, writing in dissent,
makes the obvious point that there is nothing in the language of the Charter to
suggest that the political remedy is the sole remedy. Id. at 1383-85 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). On the contrary, the political remedy is an extraordinary remedy,
since it was the expectation of the framers of the Charter that states would
comply with ICJ decisions, and that expectation has been largely realized. See
Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant
Executive Authority, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 301-02, n.7 (2008)
(describing Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter as creating an additional
enforcement option, which has never been used and which in any case does not
render an ICJ judgment any less binding); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of
Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 378 (2008) (“[W]hile Article 94(2) also
provides for possible referral to the Security Council in the event of
noncompliance, this scarcely detracts from the international legal obligation to
comply.”).
178
The Majority opinion first cites to a statement made in the hearings of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to the effect that “if a state fails to
perform its obligations under a judgment of the [ICJ], the other party may have
recourse to the Security Council.” Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359, citing Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 124-25 (1945) (emphasis
added). The phrase “may have recourse” hardly suggests an exclusive remedy.
The Majority opinion then cites to statements of Leo Paslovsky, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for International Organizations and Security
Affairs, and Charles Fahy, Legal Advisor to the State Department. Medellín,
128 S.Ct. at 1359. Paslovsky recognizes that a state’s refusal to implement a
decision of the ICJ creates a political rather than a legal dispute. Such a
statement is not in the least surprising, since the Security Council is a political
body. Paslovsky said nothing about the exclusivity of the remedy. Fahy stated
only that parties accepting ICJ jurisdiction have a moral obligation to comply
with ICJ decisions and that Article 94(2) provides the exclusive means of
enforcement of such decisions. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1359-60. There is no
disputing the accuracy of Fahy’s statement as a matter of international law. It is
very difficult to see why it is relevant to the question of whether ICJ decisions
are enforceable as domestic law. As Justice Breyer points out, one would not
expect the U.N. Charter, or any international agreement, to specify the status of
its provisions as a matter of domestic law. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
177
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such unilateral statements is not called for under the Supreme
Court precedents on which Chief Justice Roberts relies, Foster v.
Neilson and Perchemen, as those cases seem to stand for the
principle that treaties are to be considered self-executing unless the
parties to the treaties intend otherwise.179
There is more than a little irony in Chief Justice Roberts’
argument that the U.N. Charter cannot be treated as self-executing
absent clearer language in the treaty or the legislative history
behind its ratification. Foreign relations, the Chief Justice reminds
us, is committed by the Constitution to the political departments.180
If we were to treat the Charter as self-executing, that “would
eliminate the option of non-compliance contemplated by Article
94(2), undermining the ability of the political branches to
determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment.”181
But in this case, the President has determined how to comply with
the ICJ judgment. He directed state courts to implement the Avena
decision.182 The other political branch was silent. The effect of
the Majority opinion is to prevent the Executive branch from
conducting foreign policy (even where it faces no political
opposition) by complying with an international court’s decision
and to entrust control over U.S. foreign relations to the courts of
the State of Texas. As we shall see in Part IV. B., infra, this is
pretty much exactly the result the Framers sought to avoid through
the Supremacy Clause.
Chief Justice Roberts proceeds to defend his interpretive
approach as rooted in two cases from the early Republic, Foster
and Percheman.183 The dissent characterizes that approach as
“look[ing] for the wrong thing (explicit textual expression about
self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong
179

See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 706-08 (arguing that
permitting the U.S. to determine unilaterally whether a treaty is self-executing is
inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause as interpreted in Foster and
Perchemen).
180
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1360.
181
Id.
182
See President’s Memorandum, supra note 4.
183
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1362.
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place (the treaty language).”184 The Chief Justice accepts this
characterization,185 but says little in its defense beyond the paltry
citations to authority already indicated. Nor does the Majority
respond to the dissent’s arguments that courts have routinely found
treaties to be self-executing despite the lack of a clear statement
that no further legislative action was required.186 Indeed, as Justice
Stevens’ concurring opinion can only name one ratified and one
un-ratified treaty that would pass the Majority’s clear statement
rule187 it is obvious that the Majority’s clear statement standard has
never been the operative test for self-execution under U.S. law.188
The Majority opinion nevertheless rejects the dissent’s far more
traditional approach to the issue of self-execution on the ground
that it is “arrestingly indeterminate.”189
This is a baffling verdict. The Majority opinion is completely
untethered to any constitutional authority; it meanders across two
centuries of legal opinions and plucks out a handful of cases that
do not even support its interpretive approach, and then it briefly
visits the relevant treaty texts190 before rifling through the relevant
184

Id. at 1389 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1362 (“[W]e have to confess that we do think it rather important
to look to the treaty language to see what it has to say about the issue.”).
186
Id. at 1380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187
Id. at 1373 and n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
188
Id. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189
Id. at 1362.
190
The Majority’s approach to treaty interpretation, which pays no attention to
the object and purpose of the treaty or to its drafting history, is inconsistent with
both international and domestic law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1968),
Art. 31(1); Air France v. Saks, 105 S.Ct. 1338 (1985). The Majority cites to Air
France for the principle that “the interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with its
text” and also notes cases in which the Court has also considered “the
negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as the ‘postratification
understanding’ of signatory nations.” Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1357. However,
the Majority includes only the most limited discussion of the negotiation and
drafting history of the relevant treaties and limits its inquiry into the
“postratification understanding” of those treaties to that of the United States.
Indeed, Jordan Paust suggests that the Majority ignores evidence that the VCCR
is self-executing. Paust, Medellín, Avena, 31 SUFF. TRANSNAT’L L. REV. at 304,
n. 15 (citing numerous authorities in support of the claim that the United States
185
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ratification history to pluck out a few perhaps helpful quotations.
How this approach is any more determinate than the dissent’s
traditional deference to the Supremacy Clause is hard to fathom.
Indeed, the decision calls the enforceability of innumerable treaties
into doubt, as evidenced by a decision of the American Bar
Association and the American Society of International Law to
form a joint task force to evaluate the efficacy of U.S. treaties as a
matter of domestic law in the aftermath of Medellín.191 Justice
Breyer is simply correct to point out that the Majority opinion
“erects legal hurdles that can threaten the application of provisions
in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it more
difficult to negotiate new ones.”192
B. The Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of Self-Execution
Justice Breyer, writing in dissent in Medellín, identifies the
issue in that case as whether or not “an ICJ judgment rendered
pursuant to the parties’ consent to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction . . .
automatically become[s] part of domestic law.”193 Unlike the
Majority, Justice Breyer concludes that the issue cannot be
answered by looking to the language of the treaties at issue.
Rather, the issue must be resolved as a matter of domestic law,
with reference to early cases, decided by “Justices well aware of
the Founders’ original intent” in adopting the Supremacy
Clause.194 Based on a very abbreviated discussion of those cases,
guided by the relevant scholarship,195 Justice Breyer concludes that
the ICJ’s Avena judgment “is enforceable as a matter of domestic
law without further legislation.”196 That conclusion is of less
significance to us than is the scholarship on the original meaning
considers the VCCR self-executing and supreme federal law). See also,
Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 116 F.3d at 622 (Butzner, J., concurring) (stating
that the VCCR is self-executing).
191
E-mail from Elizabeth Anderson, Executive Director of the American
Society of International Law (July 2, 2008) (listing members of the Task Force)
(on file with author).
192
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193
Id. at 1377.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 1377-80.
196
Id. at 1377.
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of the Supremacy Clause that Justice Breyer summarizes and the
Chief Justice ignores. What follows is an expanded summary of
the scholarship invoked by the dissenting Justices, supplemented
with additional scholarship not referenced in the Medellín
opinions. It is striking that none of this background, relevant to the
original meaning of the Supremacy Clause, informs the Majority
opinion. Indeed, even the dissent provides only a hint of the vast
evidence suggesting that the original intent and meaning of the
Supremacy Clause was to create a presumption in favor of selfexecution.
The purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent U.S.
treaty violations “by empowering the courts to enforce treaties at
the behest of affected individuals without awaiting authorization
from state or federal legislatures.”197 This presumption of selfexecution, though limited,198 was in marked contrast, in the
Framers’ view, to the laws of England199 and in the American
colonies under the Articles of Confederation.200 Indeed, the
Supremacy Clause embodied the Framers’ response to the more

197

Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 696.
See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 696-97 (identifying four
grounds on which a court might conclude legitimately that a treaty required
legislative action for enforcement).
199
See id. at 697 & n. 12 (stating that under the fundamental law of Great
Britain, treaties were non-self-executing except that admiralty and prize courts
were empowered to give direct effect to the laws of nations, including treaties).
See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 254 (1829) (contrasting the general rule
of international law regarding treaties, whereby they are not automatically
domestic law with the “different principle” announced under the Supremacy
Clause); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 276 (1796) (opinion of J. Iredell) (calling
the British practice of requiring legislative effectuation of treaty provisions
“constantly observed”). Martin Flaherty points out that the Framers may have
been incorrect in their assumption that treaties were presumptively non-selfexecuting under the laws of England. Flaherty, History Right, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. at 2112.
200
See Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 698 (noting the
“widespread understanding” that treaties concluded by the Continental Congress
were not enforceable in state courts in the face of conflicting legislation and the
federal government’s lack of a mechanism for making state courts enforce
treaties).
198
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general problem of enforcing federal law.201 The Framers adopted
the more radical language of the New Jersey plan, declaring
treaties to be “the supreme Law of the Land,” rather than giving
Congress the power to “negative” state legislation as proposed in
the rival Virginia Plan, thus incorporating U.S. treaties into
domestic law with no requirement for congressional
implementation.202
As Justice Breyer notes,203 James Madison explained that the
Supremacy Clause was necessary to prevent the federal
government from being embarrassed by state regulation that
substantially frustrated the government’s ability to comply with
treaty obligations, as had occurred under the Articles of
Confederation.204 Numerous statements by other significant
Framers support this view of the purpose and meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. As early as 1786, John Jay advocated for a
rule prohibiting the legislatures of the several states from passing
any act that could in any way restrain, limit or counteract the
operation or execution of a treaty.205 James Iredell, a member of
the North Carolina ratifying convention206 and thus precisely the
sort of person in whose views a textualist originalist ought to take
an interest,207 similarly viewed a treaty as “law of the land,”
201

See id. (calling this problem the “principal reason for the Framers’ decision
to draft a new constitution rather than amend the Articles” of Confederation.).
202
Id. at 698-99.
203
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
204
THE FEDERALIST, No. 42, 264 (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961) (J. Madison). See
also Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. at 277 (opinion of J. Irdedell) (noting that the
Supremacy Clause was passed to prevent states from ignoring treaty obligations,
a “difficulty which every one knows had been the means of greatly distressing
the union, and injuring its public credit”).
205
Jay, report to congress, Oct. 13, 1786, quoted in 1 CHARLES HENRY
BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 268, 274, n. 4
(1902). See also Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 760-61
(remarking that Congress unanimously adopted Jay’s report, reflecting the
expectation that treaties would be supreme law, and that Jay made similar
remarks after becoming Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court).
206
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378.
207
See YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE, at 27-28 (arguing that the views of
the ratifiers of the Constitution are the most important, since the ratifiers bound
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binding upon the people.208 In South Carolina, both John Rutledge
and Charles Pinckney stated their views that treaties were
“paramount” laws.209 Not surprisingly, these views are consistent
with the express language of the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause,210 which declares treaties supreme federal law, operative
notwithstanding any contrary state law.
Early Supreme Court decisions are also consistent with the
express language of the Supremacy Clause.211 In Ware v.
Hylton,212 for example, a British creditor sought payment of an
American’s Revolutionary War debt pursuant to the 1783 Paris
Peace Treaty.213 The debtor claimed that he had paid the debt by
paying the money owed into a Virginia state fund in accordance
with Virginia law.214 Each Justice wrote separately in the case, but
all agreed that the Virginia statute was invalid.215 In his Medellín
dissent, Justice Breyer appropriately focused on the opinion of
Justice Iredell,216 which distinguished between portions of the
treaty that had been “executed” and those which were
“executory.”217 Justice Iredell defined “executed” as treaty
provisions that “from the nature of them . . . require no further act
to be done.”218 Executory provisions are addressed to a branch of
the federal government because “when a nation promises to d o a
the people they represented through their votes and therefore their understanding
of the document is the most relevant original meaning).
208
See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 761 and n. 9
(noting that Iredell, like Jay, made similar comments after becoming a Justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court).
209
Id. at 763.
210
U.S. Const. art. VI, ¶ 2.
211
See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. at 765 and n. 36
(listing ten cases decided between 1796 and 1825 in which “treaty law was
accepted as operating as supreme federal law in the face of inconsistent state
law”).
212
3 Dall. 199 (1796).
213
Id. at 203-04.
214
Id. at 220-21 (opinion of Chase, J).
215
Id. at 285.
216
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
217
Ware, 3 Dall. at 272.
218
Id.

46

NAME OF JOURNAL

2008

thing, it is to be understood that this promise is to be carried into
execution, in the manner which the Constitution of that nation
prescribes.”219 Iredell thus suggests that treaties that “prescribe
laws to the people for their obedience” must be implemented
through legislative action.220 But Iredell then goes on to explain
that after the passage of the Constitution, if a treaty is
constitutional, “it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be
executed in fact.” 221 In short, Iredell rejects the notion that after
the Supremacy Clause there can be any talk of non-self-executing
treaty provisions.222
In its first case expressly addressing the issue, the Marshall
Court recognized that, while treaties are generally viewed as
contract between two states that require execution by the sovereign
power of the respective states, in the United States a “different
principle” is established, according to which treaties are to be
regarded as equivalent to acts of the legislature, so long as the
treaty can “operate of itself, without the aid of any legislative
provision.”223 This notion of treaties that operate by themselves is
the source of the doctrine of self-execution.224 But when does a
treaty operate of itself? Carlos Vázquez contends that the effect of
the “different principle” under U.S. law is to create a presumption
of self-execution, unless the parties make clear through treaty
language a contrary intent.225 Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion
accepts that presumption, providing that a treaty is self-executing
219

Id.
Id.
221
Id. at 277.
222
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion loses sight of this dynamic in Justice
Iredell’s Ware opinion when Justice Breyer relies on that opinion to suggest that
treaties that address certain subject matters address themselves to the political
branches. Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1382 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Iredell’s
position, as Justice Breyer himself presents it, is that the question of whether or
not a treaty addresses itself to a particular department of the government is
rendered moot by the Supremacy Clause.
223
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
224
Vázquez, Four Doctrines, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. at 701.
225
Id. at 703 (suggesting that parties can alter the rule in favor of selfexecution by providing in the treaty that rights and liabilities of individuals
arising from the treaty will be established though subsequent legislative acts).
220
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“unless it specifically contemplates execution by the legislature
and thereby ‘addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department.’”226 This suggests that, contrary to the Majority’s
approach, the question of whether or not a treaty requires
legislative action before it can be binding domestic law
enforceable in U.S. courts should turn on the intent of the parties to
the treaty.
The approved method for determining the intent of the parties
to an international agreement is set forth in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLoT). Although the United States has
not ratified VCLoT, it is generally recognized as embodying
principles of customary international law227 which are binding on
the United States.228 Both the U.S. Department of State,229 and
federal courts have recognized that VCLoT codifies customary
international law.230 Courts have repeatedly recognized its
226

Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Foster, 2 Pet.
at 314). Justice Breyer also notes Justice Baldwin’s remark that “’it would be a
bold proposition’ to assert ‘that an act of Congress must be first passed’ in order
to give a treaty effect as ‘a supreme law of the land.’” Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at
1379 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Lessee of Pollared’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 14
Pet. 353, 388 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring)).
227
See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 & n. 3 (5th ed., 2003)
(citing ICJ cases recognizing VCLoT as relecting customary international law).
228
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2764 (2004) (recognizing
that violations of customary international law are enforceable in U.S. courts
without the need for congressional action); The Paquete Habana, 20 S.Ct. 290,
299 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.”).
229
See Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 298 (1988) (citing Robert
Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty affairs within the Department of
State, who said that the U.S. relied on VCLoT for dealing with many day-to-day
treaty problems, and Secretary of State Roger’s report to the President,
characterizing VCLoT as “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and
practice”).
230
See Avero Belgium Ins. v. American Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.
2005) (relying on VCLoT as an “authoritative guide” to the customary
international law of treaties); Chubb & Sons v. Asiana Airlines, 215 F.3d 301,
308 (2000) (characterizing VCLoT as a restatement of customary rules which
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authority as embodying customary international law with respect to
treaty interpretation specifically.231
VCLoT provides that a treaty must be “interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.” 232 Included in VCLoT’s conception of “context” are the
text of the treaty, including any preambles or annexes,233 any
related agreements,234 or related instruments.235 In addition, in
interpreting a treaty, an adjudicatory body must take into account
subsequent agreements236 and practice, 237 as well as relevant rules
of international law. 238 In case the interpretation arrived at
through this method is ambiguous or obscure239 or manifestly
unreasonable,240 that interpretation may be confirmed, or the
meaning may be determined through the use of supplementary
materials, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its drafting. 241
bind states whether or not they are parties to the treaty); Aquamar, S.A. v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n. 40 (11th Cir.1999)
(“Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards
the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the
international law of treaties.”) (citations omitted). More specifically, see
Weinberger v. Rossi, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1514, n. 5 (1982) (citing Article 2(1)(a) as
codifying customary international law).
231
See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549, 2569 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Article 31.1. as a codification of custom);
Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.1997) (citing
Articles 31 and 32 as embodying customary international law), rev'd on other
grounds, 119 S.Ct. 662 (1999). See also SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 811 & n.
4 (citing numerous international tribunals that have recognized the authority of
VCLoT’s rules for interpretation of treaties).
232
VCLoT, Art. 31(1).
233
Id., Art. 31(2).
234
Id. Art. 31(2)(a).
235
Id., Art. 31(2)(b).
236
Id., Art. 31(3)(a).
237
Id., Art. 31(3)(b).
238
Id., Art. 31(3)(c).
239
Id., Art. 32(a).
240
Id., Art. 32(b).
241
Id., Art. 32.
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In Air France v. Saks,242 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
the Warsaw Convention on International Air Transport in a manner
consistent with VCLoT. The Court began with a thorough
investigation of the relevant provisions of the Convention in both
English243 and in French,244 the language of their drafting, as
required under VCLoT.245 The Court then proceeded to a
discussion of the negotiating history of the relevant provisions246
and the conduct of the parties to the Convention with respect to
those provisions, which also entailed a discussion of the parties’
subsequent interpretations of the provisions. 247 Finally, the Court
consulted subsequent agreements among the parties to determine if
those agreements indicated an intention to depart from the original
meaning of the Convention.248 Neither the Majority nor the dissent
engage in this sort of careful assessment of the intended meaning
of the treaties at issue in Medellín.
Neither the Majority nor the dissenting opinion in Medellín are
exemplary in terms of their adherence to the generally recognized
rules for treaty interpretation. Indeed, perhaps conceding that this
is the sort of activity worth doing only if it can be done well, none
of the Justices make much of an effort to discern the object and
purpose of the relevant treaties. Still, the dissent does a far better
job of considering the original meaning of the relevant
constitutional provision and its role in our constitutional history.
Although the Justices who joined the Majority opinion prefer to
ride under the banners of originalism and judicial restraint, the
Medellín Majority’s position betrays both of those causes. The
Majority pays no attention to the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause, and it frustrates the federal executive by
thwarting its attempt to comply with an international obligation.
Instead, the Majority permits the courts of the State of Texas to
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

105 S.Ct. 1339 (1985)
Id. at 1341-42
Id. at 1342-43
VCLoT, Art. 33.
Air France, 105 S.Ct. at 1343-44
Id. at 1344-45.
Id. at 1346.
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place the United States in violation of an international judgment
with which the federal government sought to comply.

V. WHAT REMAINS
Medellín’s case never should have come before the Supreme
Court. President Bush intervened in Medellín’s case through the
President’s Memorandum in what turned out to be a failed attempt
to comply with an international judgment, in keeping with the
United States’ international obligations and the President’s
understanding of his constitutional authority over foreign affairs.
This Part argues that the President’s efforts were unsuccessful
because they were insincere.249 The President has a duty to take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.250 This Part will first
develop an argument for how the President, pursuant to the
obligations attendant to the Take Care Clause, can take effective
action to prevent cases such as Medellín from arising.
Some have arged that the Take Care Clause mandates that
“[t]he President should be able to do what is necessary to execute
the supreme law of the land by overriding a state law or procedure
that, if carried out, would cause the United States to violate the
treaty.”251 In its strongest form, this reading of the Take Care
249

See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 372 (noting
that the Bush administration “purports to implement Avena” while also claiming
that doing so is optional and that the ICJ decision misreads the VCCR). John
Cerone has neatly expressed the peculiarity of the Bush administration’s actions:
U.S. President George W. Bush has intervened (1) on
behalf of a (non-white-collar) criminal defendant, (2) in a
death penalty case, (3) in Texas, (4) invoking principles of
comity, (5) with reference to an international legal obligation
o[f] the United States, (6) as determined by an international
court, (7) in a judgment that penetrates deeply into the
domestic criminal justice system, (8) of Texas.
What’s not wrong with this picture?
Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President’s Intervention in Medellín, 31 SUFF.
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 277, 277 (2008).
250
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
251
Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts - The United
States Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.'S Avena Judgment Relating
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Clause would support the view that the President’s Memorandum
ordering states to implement the Avena decision should be given
the force of law.252 One need not go so far. The Court has not
held that the Take Care Clause does not empower the President to
override state law.253 But the Take Care Clause still gives rise to a
constitutional duty to work with Congress to override state law.
This Part concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. executive’s
on-going failure to Take Care that the ICJ’s Avena decision is
implemented as required under both international and domestic law
pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.
A. Implementing Treaties through the Take Care Clause
Medellín and his amici were loathe to rely on the Take Care
Clause in arguing that President Bush had constitutional power to
direct state courts to implement the Avena judgment.254 That was
likely an appropriate decision for litigation purposes, since the
powers associated with the Take Care Clause have not been well
established in the case law.255 But there are relatively simple
measures that the President can take, in accordance with the
executive’s constitutional powers, to ensure U.S. compliance with
its treaty obligations.
to a U.S. Obligation under the Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERM. L. J.
619, 631 (2008).
252
Not surprisingly, Medellín’s attorneys made this argument in their opening
brief in the Supreme Court. See Brief for Petitioner, at 17, Medellín v. Texas,
No. 06-984 (U.S. June 28 2007) (“Both historical practice and this Court’s
decisions make clear that this authority affords the President discretion to
determine the means of enforcement of statutes and treaties to the extent not
specified by Congress or the treaty, and to take such other steps as may be
necessary to ensure that the powers that the Constitution gives to the federal
government can be carried into effect.”).
253
See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. at 1372 (finding that the Take Care Clause
“allows the President to execute laws, not make them).
254
See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 341 (noting
that the Take Care Clause plays a “bit part in debates over presidential
authority” and that Medellín considered reliance on the Take Care Clause
unnecessary “in light of the President’s well-established foreign affairs
powers”).
255
See id. at 335 (noting that reliance on the Take Care clause has fallen out of
favor).
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Quite simply, the President’s duty under the Take Care Clause
requires that the executive branch draft whatever legislation is
necessary to implement all treaty obligations to the extent that
those obligations are not self-executing. Before elaborating on this
thesis, however, we must first entertain a few objections to this
reading of the Take Care Clause.
First, there is some controversy over whether the Take Care
Clause, which refers to “the Laws” and does not mention treaties,
entails a duty of the President to faithfully execute treaties.256 Still,
the overwhelming majority of scholars who have touched on the
issue have concluded that the Framers intended to include both
congressional laws and treaties in the “Laws” to be executed under
the Take Care Clause.257 Whatever the views of the Framers,
courts have generally adopted the view that “the Laws”
encompassed within the Take Care Clause include treaties.258 The
Supreme Court endorsed this view in In re Neagle259 and again in
United States v. Midwest Oil Co.260 Indeed, even the boldest
advocates of unilateral executive authority concede that the

256

See id. at 343 (conceding that the question of treaties’ status under the Take
Care clause is not “free from doubt”).
257
See id. at 343-46 (assembling key statements from the Framers expressing
the view that the President’s Take Care duties includes a duty to execute
treaties); Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1232 (finding no
textual or historical basis for the claim that the Take Care Clause applies only to
statutes); Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva
Conventions? 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (concluding that the Take Care
Clause entails a presidential duty to execute treaties). But see MICHAEL J.
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 203 (1990) (contending that the Take
Care Clause only applies to laws enacted by the legislature).
258
Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 347.
259
10 S.Ct. 658, 668 (1890) (implying through a rhetorical question that the
duties arising from the Take Care Clause entail “the rights, duties, and
obligations growing out of the constitution itself, our international relations, and
all the protection implied by the nature of the government under the
constitution”).
260
35 S.Ct. 309, 325 (1915) (stating that the President’s duties under the Take
Care Clause entail “’the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitution
itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of
the government under the Constitution’”) (quoting Neagle).
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President may not refuse to enforce a treaty in force because to do
so would violate the Take Care Clause.261
Next, some have argued that because non-self-executing
treaties are not Supreme Law, they are excluded from the ambit of
the Take Care Clause.262 Rather, non-self executing treaties are to
be executed by Congress, thus relieving the President of his Take
Care duties.263 The claim is a peculiar one, given the widelyacknowledged confusion regarding what constitutes a non-selfexecuting treaty.264 Moreover, since the distinction between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties is not of constitutional
origin,265 it is hard to use that distinction as a means of specifying
the ambit of the Take Care Clause. One way to reconcile the
constitutional text, which states that all treaties are supreme law,
with our practice, in which non-self-executing treaties are not
given that effect as supreme law, is to characterize non-selfexecuting treaties as non-justiciable – that is, supreme law but,
until executed, not a source of judicially-enforceable rights.266
This is an elegant solution, but it turns on agreement on the
meaning of “non-self-executing,” and no such agreement exists.267
The objection is not a huge impediment to the argument of this
Article. Those who take issue with the President’s power to take
261

Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Hon. William H. Taft,
IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State 4 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/02YooTaft.pdf (last visited
July 16, 2008).
262
See, e.g., Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1230, 1261 (2007) (contending that the President
has no duty to take care that non-self-executing treaties are faithfully executed);
Michael P. van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 334 (2006) (“If a particular treaty does not
create of its own force a directly cognizable federal law right, obligation, or
power, there is nothing – at least not yet – for the president to ‘execute’ under
the Take Care Clause”).
263
Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1232.
264
See supra note 170.
265
See supra note 165.
266
Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1233.
267
See supra note 170.

54

NAME OF JOURNAL

2008

care that a non-self-executing treaty is faithfully executed have in
mind a positive power to execute the laws.268 Here, we are only
concerned with a presidential duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed. For our purposes, there is no need to show that
the President could, through the exercise of some variety of Article
II power, give domestic effect to a non-self-executing treaty. It is
enough if the Take Care Clause mandates that the President
undertake legal or political measures to effectuate such treaties as
domestic law.
The Take Care Clause is not a grant of additional enforcement
or execution powers to the President. Rather, as Joseph Story put
it, “the true interpretation of the clause is, that the President is to
use all such means as the Constitution and laws have placed at his
disposal to enforce the due execution of the laws.”269 The point is
that the President may not choose to enforce some laws and not
others.270 In addition, although the Take Care Clause is not a
source of new presidential powers not otherwise delegated in
Article II, it is an exhortation to the President to promote full
compliance with the law, not only by the executive branch but by
all arms of the government.271
B. Avena, Medellín and the Way Forward
In at least some respects, the Medellín opinion provides clear
guidance. The Supreme Court has clearly found that the treaties at
issue in the case are non-self-executing and that the President’s
Memorandum is insufficient to override state law. If the President
is serious about implementing the Avena decision, the State of
268

See Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 362
(contending that the Supreme Court has recognized that the Take Care Clause
entails executive powers as well as duties).
269
JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 292, 178 (1854). See also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 124 (2007) (“[T]he take –care
clause . . . is phrased as a duty, not a power; it does not give the President
authority to enforce the law but only imposes the obligation to use other
presidential powers to that end.”).
270
Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. at 360.
271
Id. at 370.
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Texas itself, in its Medellín merits brief, made clear what the
executive needs to do: it needs to coordinate with Congress or the
States.272 Texas first suggests that the President could work with
Congress to create a federal exception to the state procedural rule
that bars successive habeas petitions in cases involving violations
of the VCCR.273 Texas next recommends that the President could
simply enter into a bilateral agreement with Mexico requiring
federal judicial review of the cases addressed in Avena.274 Finally,
Texas proposes an executive panel to provide the “review and
reconsideration” require under Avena. Any findings of actual
prejudice could be communicated to state pardon and parole
boards along with a presidential request that the panel’s
recommendation “be given great weight in state clemency
proceedings.”275
Of these options, only the first has any meaningful opportunity
of rendering Avena enforceable in U.S. courts. A bilateral
agreement with Mexico would be no more self-executing than the
U.N. Charter. In connection with its proposal that the President
establish an executive panel to provide review and reconsideration
of cases like Medellín’s, Texas has stated that it would be willing
to “accord considerable weight” to executive findings of
prejudice.276 This assertion is hard to credit, given that past
requests from branches of the federal government in the context of
VCCR litigation have gone unheeded. For example, the Governor
of Virginia proceeded with the execution of Angel Francisco
Breard, despite Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s request
urging him to await a ruling by the ICJ.277 Nor has the State of
Texas been moved by Justice Stevens’ arguments that the Court’s
Medellín judgment does nothing to foreclose Texas from assuming
the minimal costs involved in granting Medellín the review and
reconsideration required by the Avena decision.278 Indeed, on
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Brief for Respondent, at 46, Medellín v. Texas, No. 06-984 (Aug. 2007)
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47, n.32.
See supra note 50.
Medellín, 128 S.Ct. at 1374-75 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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August 5, 2008, Texas executed Medellín, after the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, refused to order a stay of execution.279
The Bush administration contends that it has intervened most
forcefully on behalf of the Avena defendants. The President’s
Memorandum was, in and of itself, extraordinary.280 In both state
court proceedings and in the federal courts, the Bush
administration also filed amicus briefs on behalf of Medellín and
other Avena defendants.281 In addition, since the Court’s ruling in
Medellín, the Bush administration continued to attempt to persuade
Texas to grant review and reconsideration of Medellín’s case,282
until Medellín’s execution.
Although Medellín’s case ended with is life, the Avena case
continues. On June 5, 2008, Mexico filed with the ICJ a Request
for Interpretation of Judgment in the Avena Case283 and a request
for provisional measures.284 In that context, it is striking that the
Bush Administration has taken no steps to work with Congress
towards implementing the Avena decision, as that is precisely the
course of action prescribed by the Medellín Majority. During oral
proceedings in the most recent ICJ case, Judge Bennouna asked the
State Department’s Legal Advisor, John Bellinger, about the views
of the United States Congress on the Avena judgment. Mr.
Bellinger responded as follows:

279

James C. McKinley, Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N. Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2008).
280
See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008), ¶ 9, at 11.
281

See id., ¶¶ 10, 13-14, at 11-13.
See id., ¶ 21, at 16.
283
Request for the Interpretation of the Judgment of March 31 2004 in the
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States
v. United States of America), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/139/14582.pdf (last visited July 17, 2008).
284
Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14582.pdf (last visited
July 17, 2008).
282
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Congress has not in fact adopted legislation on this issue,
so there is no real way for me to represent to you the
view of our “Congress” as such…. It is worth noting
though that – even assuming a large number of
individual Members of Congress might agree that the
Avena decision is binding as a matter of international
law – it does not necessarily mean that Congress would
adopt legislation on the point. Congress is a political
body, and the actions of Members of Congress can be
affected by a wide range of factors.285

True enough, but one of those factors is whether or not the
executive branch is pressuring Members of Congress to pass a
particular piece of legislation. That is not happening under the
current administration.286
The treaties at issue in Medellín are not the only ones that are
in need of domestic implementation. The United States routinely
attaches “Reservations, Understandings and Declarations” to the
human rights treaties it ratifies declaring them to be non-selfexecuting.287 There is nothing wrong with this practice in and of
itself, but some human rights treaties specify that signatories must
take all measures necessary to implement their substantive
provisions as domestic law. 288 By declaring these provisions to
285

See Verbatim Record, Oral Proceedings in the Case Concerning the Request
for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of
America) (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 20, 2008), 12 at ¶ 17 .
286
Bellinger explains the government’s inaction as follows: “Given the short
legislative calendar for our Congress this year, it would not be possible for both
houses of our Congress to pass legislation to give the President authority to
implement the Avena decision. There is simply not enough time. Verbatim
Record, ¶ 26, at 17 (Remarks of John Bellinger, June 19, 2008).
287
David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129,
139-42 (1999).
288
See, e.g., The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art.
2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (“[E]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); The United Nations Convention
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be non-self executing and then not executing them, the United
States effectively renders its participation in the treaty regime
meaningless for domestic purposes, since domestic courts dismiss
individual claims brought under such human rights treaties on the
basis that the treaties at issue are not self- executing and/or do not
create a private right of action.289 U.S. Presidents’ failure to abide
by their take care duties places the United States in on-going
violation of multiple treaty duties.
For example, the Human Rights Committee, tasked with
interpreting and enforcing the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, released a general comment in which it stated that
Article 2 of the Covenant “requires that States Parties take the
necessary steps to give effect to the Covenant rights in the
domestic order.”290 Given the United States declaration that
substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing,
coupled with its failure to execute the relevant provisions, the
Human Rights Committee’s comment indicates that the United
States is currently in violation of its obligations under the
Covenant.
On July 16, 2008, by a vote of 7-5, the ICJ ordered the United
States to take “all measures necessary to ensure” that five Mexican
nationals, including Medellín are not executed pending judgment
on Mexico’s Request for Interpretation, unless they are accorded
the review and reconsideration called for in the Avena judgment.291
Agaisnt Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Art. 2.1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) (“Each State
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction”).
289
Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Towards
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628,
639 (2007). See also Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights,
24 YALE J. INT'L L. at 197-203 (summarizing judicial decisions).
290
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on Article 3 of the
Covenant: the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 13, CCPR/C/74/CRP.4Rev.6 (Apr. 21, 2004).
291
Order, Request for the Indication of Provision Measures (Mex. v. U.S.) ¶
80II.(a), p. 19, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/139/14639.pdf
(last visited July 17, 2008).
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This new order accords the executive a compelling opportunity to
approach Congress to find a way out of this international impasse.
The Take Care Clause is unlikely to provide the basis for any legal
claim that the President has failed in his constitutional duties.
Rather, the mechanisms for the enforcement of the Take Care
Clause are political: the impeachment process and the ballot
box.292 And so, the best way to encourage the executive to abide
by its Take Care duties may be organizing at the grass roots level
and through professional organizations, such as the American Bar
Association and the American Society of International Law, that
can put pressure on the United States Department of State to make
the full implementation of treaties a domestic priority.293

CONCLUSION
It’s always bad when the Supreme Court makes an unreasoned
decision. From that perspective, Medellín is no better or worse
than other decisions in which the Court’s self-proclaimed
originalists have departed from their allegiance to the Constitution
in favor of their own agendas. But Medellín is uniquely important
because it is the first Supreme Court decision that proclaims that
there are to be no domestic consequences when the U.S. violates
its international obligations. The case sends a strong message to
the United States’s trading partners that it cannot be counted on.
This regrettable decision may nonetheless result in a public good.
It provides the opportunity for a new administration, in reliance on
its Take Care Clause duties, to work aggressively with a new
Congress to promote the United States’ full participation in and
compliance with the treaties that it has ratified.
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Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEO. L. J. at 1233.
On July 18, 2008, the current and past presidents of the American Society
of International Law sent letters to the U.S. Congress urging action to “ensure
that the Untied States lives up to its binding international legal obligations under
the [VCCR] and the United Nations Charter.” A copy of the letter is available at
www.asil.org/presidentsltr (last visited August 7, 2008).
293

